

The multiplication of transnational networks, and the fact that more and more groups have interests to defend on a transnational basis, is not questionable.⁵⁹ Yet the discourse about a regional civil society ought to be deconstructed to uncover strategies of appropriation of the spaces provided for civil society's participation in the regional integration processes, as in any international organizations. Civil societies are probably better off activating integration from below than they are contributing to some sort of participatory democracy at a regional level. Although I admit this is quite a skeptical conclusion, it derives from the observation that the opening of spaces for participation has often entailed corporatism.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Integration and Common Goods

The parliamentary option and the participation of non-state actors are two palliative treatments for the regional integration processes' democratic deficit that are far from providing a perfect and permanent cure. True, there is no such thing as a yardstick to measure democratic deficit, and therefore it is not easy to evaluate the seriousness of the illness. The bottom line though is that much depends on the actors' perceptions and as two previous chapters demonstrated, they are not satisfied with the level of representative or participatory democracy applied to regional integration in Latin America. This chapter raises a quite provocative question, and explores another way of studying the democratization of regional integration processes.

What if the democratic deficit did not matter? In his theory of democracy, Giovanni Sartori pointed out that "even though scholars are somewhat reluctant to acknowledge it, they are in fact dealing less and less with *who* has power and growing more and more interested in payoffs and allocations, that is, with the *effects* of power decisions: who gets what."¹ He introduced this remark when discussing the decision-making theory of democracy, claiming that decisions in committees could be democratic, even though their members were not elected.

Sartori defined a committee as a group having three characteristics: (1) a small, interacting, face-to-face group; (2) a durable and institutionalized group; and (3) a group confronted with a flow of decisions.² For him, large groups are "compelled to employ majoritarian rules and these are, in principle, zero-sum." Conversely, committees take unanimous decisions that are positive-sum, mainly because their operating mode is what Sartori calls "deferred reciprocal compensation." Moreover, each committee is inserted in a committee system, and

interacting with other committees concedes side payments guided by anticipated reactions, as a response to co-ordination and adjustment pressures. Therefore, a “positive-sum outcome benefits all or, better, all as a *generalized aggregate*,”³ hence his expression *demo-distribution*.

Surprisingly little attention has been paid to *demo-distribution* at a regional level, even though, as we saw, the decision-making process in regional institutional arrangements involves a great number of committees in Sartori’s sense. This chapter intends to push further Sartori’s line of argument, focusing on the “who gets what” issue, without considering the decision-making process. A democratized regional integration process, in this sense, favors the general interest, producing regional public goods, and is held accountable by the citizenry. Or to put it in Scharpf’s terms, “the output perspective emphasizes ‘government *for the people*.’ Here, political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question.”⁴ Admittedly, this definition cannot easily be operationalized with robust indicators, especially for its perception dimension for which we are lacking surveys. In the following comments, I will use my own field observations, in a quite impressionistic way.

This chapter begins with a brief theoretical discussion on the relationship between regional integration and common goods. Then it evokes the European case, where for a long time it has been admitted that solidarity was a core principle of the integration process. Finally, it examines the Latin American cases, putting a special emphasis on MERCOSUR as the only regional integration process in the continent that has adopted a redistributive policy.

Integration and Regional Goods

For a whole tradition of neoclassical economists, the rationale for signing a free trade agreement is precisely that market integration yields allocation efficiency, growth, and welfare. The freer the trade, the better off the consumer will be. Therefore free trade is a common good. Few economists, however, would consider this assessment as a law and believe in the magic power of Smith’s “invisible hand” and few governments would nowadays defend sheer *laissez-faire*. Not even Adam Smith believed that the “wealth of nations” could be achieved without State intervention. In 1950, Jacob Viner introduced a classical distinction between a trade-creating custom union that is welfare-improving and a trade-diverting one that is welfare-worsening.⁵

Today, most economists acknowledge, sometimes with considerable nuances, that free trade is not necessarily a win-win situation, as the gains are not necessarily distributed in an equitable way. As Mole puts it “the answer to the question whether integration contributes towards more or towards less disparity (catching up) is not easy to answer; there are theoretical arguments that plead for and others that plead against.”⁶ When there are obvious “losers,” being countries, regions, groups, or individuals, they have to be protected somehow, because if not there will be defections and the integration process could regress. To put it in economists’ terms, a government intervention is necessary to correct non-optimal situations. In free trade areas, the usual way to protect some endangered economic interests is to provide a safeguard clause. Some agreements, as we saw, have also included in their agenda labor issues, in order to offset the predictable negative social consequences of free trade (job losses as a consequence of outsourcing or salary decreases, etc.). For that purpose, in Europe and in MERCOSUR, cohesion policies have been implemented that will be commented later in this chapter.

Whatever the effects of free trade are, and it is not my intention here to discuss them at great length, the theoretical question that remains to be addressed is whether a depoliticized free market society qualifies as democratic only because it provides public goods. I would argue that it is not the case. Using a moderately normative approach, I would qualify a system as democratic so long as its production of common goods is based on a common will to achieve collective welfare. At the individual level, for a citizen concerned with a democratic deficit but interested in outcomes, the no-matter-who-took-the-decision-as-long-as-it-serves-my-interest argument is not valid unless he can identify an allocative or redistributive mechanism, otherwise any authoritarian or corporatist regime would do. In other words, he will expect positive policy outcomes supplemented by transparency and accountability. And this is all the more true at a collective level where groups, especially the most vulnerable and deprived ones, will hope that a sense of solidarity prevails, yielding allocative and redistributive policies and not just compassion and charity. At the aggregate level, as Sartori would say, a government can take credit for serving the general interest, even though the decision-making process is not very inclusive.

Tentatively adapting this outcome-centered conception of democracy to regional integration processes, the democratization issue can be addressed at three levels, disaggregating the main whether-it-is-democratic-or-not question into three subquestions: (1) Is solidarity a

core value of the integration process? (2) Are there any regional public goods produced? And (3) are there any allocative or redistributive common policies?

The European Project of Cohesion

European integration's history consists of sequential and progressive enlargements of communitarian competences. The scope of common policies is much wider now than it has ever been, and the Union has implemented several redistributive policies.

The European project has, since the beginning been inspired by an ideal of solidarity. True, it has evolved since 1957 in its ambitions, along with its membership (table 8.1).⁷ Whereas in 1957, the treaty of Rome focused on the common market, it still put the emphasis on the social utility of trade by mentioning the "standard of living" of its six signatory countries' citizens. Thirty-five years later, with a much wider gap between the richest and the poorest of its twelve member countries, or between regions inside some countries,⁸ the 1992 Treaty on the European Union showed more concern for "economic and social progress," "economic and social cohesion," as well as "freedom, security and justice." In 2007, the laboriously adopted Treaty of Lisbon modified the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, insisting in its Article 3 on such objectives as peace, well-being, the promotion of a social market economy, full employment, and social progress, the fight against social exclusion and discrimination, or the promotion of social justice and protection, equality, solidarity and rights. This is an impressive set of social goals, reflecting the preoccupations of the poorer new Eastern and Central European members. In order to reach these goals, the EU implements policies. The first way to evaluate its redistributive capacity is to take a look at its budget.

Trying to evaluate the European commitment to public goods generation is not an easy exercise, though. Even if we leave aside the benefits reaped from the single market and focus on common policies, many collectively agreed-upon objectives are financed directly by the member states or by their regions. According to the principle of subsidiarity⁹ the Union only takes action if it proves to be more effective than other national, regional, or local levels of decision-making. It is estimated that community expenditures represent no more than 2.5% of all European public expenditures. Following the line of argument

previously presented, this does not facilitate the citizen's assessment of the Union's added value.

The EU's budget emerged out of a necessity to offset potentially negative effects of market integration. The budget was established in the 1960s at a time when it was anticipated that German industry would be the main beneficiary of market integration. The budget allocated funds to two redistributive policies, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the social funds in order to benefit the French peasants and the Italian workers. Then the regional and structural policies appeared in the 1970s and 1980s in connection with the EU's enlargements, first to Ireland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom and then to the Southern countries of Spain, Greece, and Portugal.

As a result, two policies have historically monopolized the redistributive efforts. CAP, on the one hand, still represented 44.5% of the EU budget in 2004, whereas structural actions amounted that year to 38.4%. These proportions have been reduced since the reform of CAP, and the so-called Lisbon agenda launched in 2000, with renewed priorities (research and development). However, it remains that in 2005 Agriculture still represented a policy massively funded by the Union. The ratio of the EU's budget to total European public expenditure was 71.8% for agriculture, against 14.3% for aid and development, 6.3% for research and development and 0.1% for education and training. For the period 2007–2013, the new rubric "Natural resources" absorbed 43% of the budget, against 35.6% for "Cohesion for growth and employment," 8.6% for "Competitiveness for growth and employment," 5.7% for "The EU as a global player" and 5.7% for "Administration."¹⁰

Even if the EU budget represents a mere 1% of the total GNP of all its twenty-seven members, it makes sense to wonder if it favors the general interest.

Regarding CAP, it would be difficult to claim it does. If we take the total number of beneficiaries, it does not exceed 0.01% of the total European population. Moreover, the beneficiaries are located in few countries, with France getting a great chunk of the total, and it has been demonstrated that the subsidies were very unevenly distributed. While small producers receive some modest help, the large agribusiness companies reap most of the subsidies.¹¹

As the European Commission claims in every international negotiation when confronting strong critics from developing countries, there is more to CAP than direct subsidies. CAP also helps the European farmers to keep up with high standards for quality products, take care

of the environment, and preserve many *terroirs'* (rural) specific way of life. Although the figures contradict such a claim, as they show that the small farmers producing organic food for instance are marginalized, with regard to common interest this touches an interesting point. There are a series of indirect positive externalities than can be evoked concerning CAP. Food safety, environment, or traditions and culture are public goods. But again, CAP massively favors agribusiness, an economic sector not exactly known to be socially responsible and more concerned with speculation than protecting the environment or preserving traditions. Therefore the contribution of CAP to the outcome-centered democratization of the European Union is dubious.

Structural or regional funds are more interesting, as they were inspired by an ideal of cohesion and solidarity. There are three different funds: the European social fund (ESF) created in 1958 for vulnerable workers, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) created in 1975 to reduce the development gap between regions in the Community, and the cohesion fund created in 1994 to help countries fulfill the objective of structural convergence and get ready for the monetary union in the framework set out by the Maastricht treaty. For the period 2000–2006, European regional policy had three objectives: development of lagging regions, support of areas facing structural difficulties, and support for the adaptation and modernization of policies and systems of education, training, and employment.

How successful they have been is a matter of debate. On one side, countries like Ireland, Spain, Greece, and Portugal have caught up in terms of per capita income. Yet cohesion refers also to intraregional distribution of growth, for which the balance sheet is less impressive. Regional inequalities have increased in Spain and Portugal, as they have all over Europe, with or without structural funds. This anti-redistributive bias notwithstanding, the structural funds have without a doubt generated public goods, most notably in infrastructure. Marco Schaub, for instance, advances that “European structural transfers have had a positive impact on cohesion.”¹²

In other policy areas, the EU's interventions are neither allocative nor redistributive but more normative, yet they provide important public goods. The field of justice, security, and liberty is a good example, as it responds to an increasing preoccupation among the European population facing transnational security challenges, like terrorist threats or migratory pressures. These normative policies might not develop in the future, as there are limitations to the scope of the

EU's allocative and redistributive policies. Three of these limitations deserve to be mentioned.

First, there are budgetary limits. The EU's budget has remained more or less stable, while the number of new member states has increased significantly. For the period 2000–2006, the budget was limited to 1.24% of the European GDP, when there were fifteen members. For 2006–2013, it was downsized to 1.01%, with twenty-seven members. True, this still represents a gross increase, but a modest one considering the challenge of helping the new, poorer members to catch up. Second, there are political limits. The application of the already cited subsidiarity principle has led the Commission to self-restraint in matters of legislation proposals. This clearly slows down the spill-over process and makes it more complicated for the Union to design new common policies likely to serve the general interest. And third, there are ideological limits. Even though the whole process was guided by political motives and an ultimate goal of peace in the 1950s, for a series of historical reasons the European construction started to become market-centered in the 1960s. It has included, as we saw, a preoccupation for convergence and cohesion, but the social dimension has always been lagging behind. This became very apparent with the 1980s relaunching (single market) and with the preparation for monetary union. The so-called Maastricht convergence criteria only included economic and financial indicators, in a continent that had an unemployed population of more than sixteen million. At the end of the 1990s, there was a short exception to this pattern, with the quasi-simultaneous election of leftist governments in all European countries but Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The 1997 Stability and Growth Pact, for instance, included provisions for unemployment reduction and, in 1999, an Employment pact was adopted. However, the political trend soon swung back and the following year, the so-called Lisbon-agenda focused on slow growth and low productivity, no longer directly on social issues.

Of course, there are other more fundamental reasons why the social dimension is left aside that have to do with the core institutional features of the European Union. Scharpf described them very convincingly, pointing out that “the main beneficiary of supranational European law has been negative integration.” In other words, “liberalization could be extended, without much political attention, through interventions of the European Commission” while “positive integration depends upon the agreement of national governments in their Council of Ministers.”¹³

To conclude, there seems to be a missing link between the positive policy outcomes and the citizens' perceptions that has to do with the institutional characteristics of the EU. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, only when citizens are able to identify the decision-makers can they jump to the conclusion that it does not matter how they make decisions so long as they serve the general interest. What we have in the EU is a decision-making process that generates regional public goods, involving numerous actors at different levels, in the phase of preparation, decision, and implementation.¹⁴ In many instances, European decisions are "directives" that are normative acts leaving the member states the choice of the means to achieve a goal. What the citizen will "see" then, is the implementation of a policy by their government, without knowing that it is complying with a European directive. Furthermore, the governments can typically use a blame-shifting, credit-claiming type of strategy vis-à-vis European directives. The European citizen ends up having a negative image of the European institutional arrangement, and does not see the positive outcomes that could offset the democratic deficit or the decision-making process.

Regional Public Goods in Latin America

Latin America too has been concerned with the unequal distribution of regional integration's positive outcomes. As mentioned in chapter one, distributional rivalries provoked the creation of the Andean Pact in 1969, of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in 1981 and even triggered a war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969.

Nevertheless, apart from splitting and creating new institutional arrangements with a higher degree of homogeneity between members, few efforts have been deployed to actually try to reduce development gaps. Building on the isomorphism hypothesis examined in chapter four, it could be argued that this deficit mirrors the historical absence of serious domestic redistributive policies aimed at reducing social inequalities. Latin American regional integration processes have produced norms of general interests, often without the corresponding allocation of funds. It has stuck to negative integration without many intrusions into positive integration.¹⁵

Nevertheless, there is an awareness of the problem. If we take the two oldest regional groupings, in the Andes and in Central America,

their initial objectives included preoccupations regarding “balanced and harmonious development of the Member Countries under equitable conditions,” “sub-regional solidarity,” the will “to reduce existing differences in levels of development among the Member Countries,” and to promote “enduring improvement in the standard of living,” “fair distribution of the benefits,” and “economic, social and cultural development thanks to cooperation and solidarity” (table 8.2).¹⁶ After many years, these objectives were not achieved. However, after the 1990s relaunchings, as we saw in chapter five, the scope of the agendas widened and included many new issue areas where public goods could be produced.

In the Andes for instance, we saw in chapter five that CAN had been innovative in environmental and biodiversity protection, with its 2002 Decision 523, “Regional biodiversity strategy.” As far as social issues are concerned, in harmony with its external agenda, and in particular its negotiation with the European Union, CAN is placing the topic of social cohesion on the top of its agenda. CAN has adopted an Integral Plan for Social Development (PIDS) in 2004. The plan includes a wide array of initiatives, grouped around seven programs: social and labor, education and culture, health, rural development, food security, environment, and social development in border areas.¹⁷

The example of health is interesting. The Hipólito Unanue Convention giving birth to the Andean Health Organization (ORAS) was signed in 1971, proof that social preoccupations were present right from the beginning of Andean integration. Since then, it has launched many programs that were boosted during the 1990s. The Hipólito Unanue Convention’s historical mission was to promote legislation harmonization in the region, but also to improve the common capacity to address regional challenges such as epidemics. Over the years, ORAS developed five missions, health, epidemiological vigilance and environmental health, medicine policy and health technology, human resources, health promotion and protection.¹⁸ Some of these programs have proved to be very useful. An Andean network of epidemiological vigilance for instance, publishes a weekly report presenting cases or threats of diffusion of such diseases as malaria or dengue fever. The Andean health organization has also been successful negotiating price reduction for HIV-AIDS treatments. For all its missions, ORAS receives international cooperation.

CAN’s role in producing regional goods is less recognized by the Andeans, then the European case, but not for the same reasons. Most of the time, ORAS, like CAN’s other bodies, plays the role of articulator

and facilitator of international cooperation. The decision-makers can hardly be accountable since they are not easily identifiable. In the Andean region and elsewhere in Latin America and in the developing world, an increasing number of cooperation agencies or multilateral banks are turning to the regional arena and regional public goods. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), for instance, has provided support for regional projects since its creation.¹⁹ Even if in some cases the Andean agencies manage to raise and allocate funds, they are seldom identified as decision takers.

What is strikingly interesting about the 2000s is that many new projects of regional public goods are emerging that crosscut existing regional arrangements. I will mention the three most important ones, namely infrastructure, energy, and security. First, in the fields of infrastructure, twelve countries²⁰ launched in 2000 the Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), with the support of the IADB and the Andean Development Corporation (CAF). With a chronic deficit of infrastructure, aggravated since the 1980s by underinvestment, market integration has always been bumping into serious limitations. But, as Mauricio Mesquita points out, “the importance of overcoming South America’s infrastructure deficit and eliminating its bias toward extraregional trade and road transportation goes beyond maximizing the benefits of integration. It can also play an important role in minimizing the risks that are common to South-South integration. In a group of countries with similar technology and resource endowments, integration can lead to the agglomeration of economic activities and, therefore, to an uneven distribution of benefits. Even though agglomeration can boost efficiency and raise income levels for the region as a whole, a sharp increase in regional disparities can lead to a political backlash, which, in turn, can halt or even reverse the process of integration.”²¹

IIRSA consists mainly in financing some 506 projects in transportation, telecommunication, and energy, for a total investment of more than \$68 billion in 2008.²² In a study done in 2007, Ricardo Carciofi found that less than half of IIRSA’s projects were binational.²³ IIRSA therefore predominantly helps countries on an individual basis, but nevertheless produces regional goods, as many endeavors contribute to the interconnection of infrastructure systems and have fostered cooperation between countries. Some important projects also consist in creating regional hubs, likely to be helpful for the twelve countries. Seven such hubs are being constructed, one in the Amazon (Paita-Tarapoto-Yurimaguas Road), two between Peru, Brazil, and

Bolivia (bridge over the Acre River and paving roads connecting the Brazilian States of Acre and Rondônia to the southern region of Peru), one to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans across Bolivia (Central Interoceanic hub), and three to improve the traffic flow between the MERCOSUR and Chile. IIRSA does produce regional goods, but these hub projects have a lot to do with trade facilitation, and hence favor private interests in different countries. The case of Bolivia, very much interested in the issue of trade routes toward the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, is emblematic. The Central Interoceanic web seems to have been designed to help Santa Cruz's soy bean producers export via Brazilian ports, and mineral exporters to use the Chilean port of Iquique.

IIRSA is generally considered a success. As Ricardo Carciofi puts it, "IIRSA has succeeded in focusing its agenda of activities on the development of physical infrastructure and advancing it at its own pace, in spite of the changing conditions that characterize the general context of the integration process in the region." He offers two hypothetical explanations for this success: (1) "appropriate identification of topics, which has allowed to garner consensus among the participating countries"; (2) "the fact that the work agenda has been materialized in the form of concrete results that have proven useful to the participants in the initiative as a whole."²⁴

The second example refers to energy and offers a very different scenario. True, IIRSA is also concerned with energy provision, but it is the Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez who started to redraw the map of Latin America's energy integration, in the framework of his Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) launched in 2004.²⁵ And he did it in two ways, one he made it possible for some countries to have payment facilities for the oil they are buying from Venezuela, and two, he offered to collaborate to facilitate energy transportation and supply.²⁶

It would be an exaggeration to give Chávez credit for having initiated a process of energy supply and integration in the Continent. In 1980, through the San José Pact, Venezuela and Mexico decided to provide subsidized oil to eleven Caribbean and Central American countries. The agreement has never been suspended since. As for the rest of the continent, between 1996 and 2001, the Southern Cone embarked upon a massive plan of investments in energy integration that allowed countries such as Brazil and Chile to import 6 billion cubic meters of gas in 2003 whereas they did not have any capacity to do so in 1996. The investments then sharply slowed down with the Argentine crisis.

Compared to these initiatives, Hugo Chávez's is much more ambitious though. As he declared the day he signed an agreement with the Dominican Republic,

Venezuela has under its soil the largest oil reserves in the world and the largest gas reserves in our continent, from the North Pole, from Alaska, to the Land of Fire. We have the largest gas reserves here in the Caribbean region and we want to share them with the North, the South, the East and the West, giving priority to our neighbors, our brother countries. We think that it's not fair that with the huge volumes of gas and oil we have, there are frequent power cuts in the Dominican Republic; the Northern region of Brazil does not have energy for its development; Colombia does not have enough energy for its border towns, or for the South or West of the country; Haiti does not have energy for the power plants that feed hospitals; Grenada and all of these brother countries... This isn't fair. Venezuela has recovered its deepest Bolivarian roots and more than saying it, we want to show it by really joining together and being free.²⁷

His Petroamérica program is divided into three subprograms, Petrosur, Petrocaribe, and Petrandino. Especially with the small and poor countries, Chávez has proved to be very generous.²⁸ During the fifth Petrocaribe summit (Maracaibo, Venezuela, July 13, 2008), and with oil prices over \$100 a barrel, Chávez offered to upgrade the financial terms of his offer, allowing the eighteen member states to only pay 40% of their imported oil, differing the payment of the rest over a twenty-five year period with an interest rate of only 1%.²⁹

Whatever one may think of the political dimensions or implications of this generous redistributive policy, and of Chávez's soft diplomacy, it is hard to deny that Venezuela is converting its natural endowments into some kind of regional public goods. Of course, this is not exactly true. Chávez is not making access to Venezuela's richness free, and Venezuelan oil is far from being "non-rival and non-excludable" as public goods are. Nonetheless it remains true that his strategy is reshaping the supply-side of the energy integration process.³⁰ Moreover, Chávez manages to put the integration process on a different track that is, contrary to what many think, much less politicized.³¹

The third example refers to security. Ever since its independence, Latin America has had security concerns and has tried many different formulas to dissipate them. Since World War II and the signing of the

1947 Rio Treaty, the issue has been removed from the hemispherical agenda, as the United States provides for the security of the whole continent. However, the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance signed in Rio did not eliminate all the problems. First, it did not prevent Latin American countries from raging wars against each other, as in the case of Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, or Peru and Ecuador in 1995. Second, the United States belongs to another military alliance, namely NATO, that eventually can prevail, as in the case of the Falkland War in 1982.³² Third, and most importantly, the Rio Treaty has not prevented the rise of domestic or transnational security threats. Urban violence, drug trafficking, and guerrilla upheavals have taken their toll and help raise concerns about security on the continent.

Clearly, there is not much that can be collectively done to put an end to petty crime or kidnapping in Latin American capital cities. But again, the 2000s have seen many initiatives to coordinate the repression of drug trafficking and, in 2008, there were talks about a Latin American security council. The Latin American armed forces were keen to collaborate during the 1970s to combat what they called terrorism in the Southern Cone; they are now ready to make efforts to permanently coordinate in order to prevent the possible escalation of conflicts. The 2008 crisis between Colombia and its neighbors, Ecuador and Venezuela, taught everybody a lesson.

Going back to the initial question raised in this section, security is a complex issue. Consider for one second the example of Colombia, the most exposed country in Latin America to such threats. Bogotá, the capital city, has experienced a steady yet substantial decrease in urban violence since 1993. However, most Colombians would credit President Uribe and his “democratic security” policy for this result, or the Plan Colombia, a military package between Colombia and the United States launched in 1999. A much safer Bogota is the product of many policies implemented at different levels, a complex multilevel decision-making process that has the average citizen confused and incapable of ascribing an outcome to a decision-maker who could be accountable for it.

The same goes with the other regional public goods that are not making decisive contributions to offsetting the democratic deficit.

MERCOSUR's Convergence Policy

MERCOSUR's promoters have always been concerned with development asymmetries. After NAFTA, MERCOSUR is probably the

world's second most heterogeneous regional integration process. The 1991 Treaty of Asuncion, with its institutional modesty and economy of words, simply stated in its Article 6 that "The State Parties recognize certain differentials in the rate at which the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay will make the transition." Annex 1 of the Treaty provided for a more extended phasing of trade restrictions' elimination for the two smaller members. Three years later, the 1994 Protocol of Ouro Preto mentioned in its preamble that the members were "mindful of the need to give special consideration to the less developed countries and regions of MERCOSUR." However, no specific policy was designed to substantiate this consideration. Influenced by the neoliberal mood of the 1990s, the dominant common sense firmly believed that trade liberalization would contribute to every member's welfare and help smaller partners catching-up. No progress was made in that direction during the first fifteen years of MERCOSUR's existence (table 8.3).³³ In fact, quite the contrary happened, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) indicator shows that Argentina and Paraguay caught up a little bit on Brazil, especially during the first half of the 1990s, while Paraguay was losing ground. The decade 1995–2005 then saw a stabilization of the gap. The picture is different in the case of exports, with Paraguay apparently taking full advantage of the temporary protections provided by the trade liberalization program. After the Argentine crisis, the first half of the 2000s saw a boost of Brazil's exports and an increasing gap with its neighbors.³⁴ All in all then, the panorama of asymmetries is not an encouraging one for Brazil's partners.

The two smallest countries have repeatedly complained over the years that the economic asymmetries were not seriously tackled, and that in its global political orientation, MERCOSUR was overly dominated by the Argentine–Brazilian couple. On many occasions, Uruguay even threatened to leave this bilateral MERCOSUR. A position reportedly not taken very seriously by the other partners, as Montevideo was attempting to become the capital of MERCOSUR. Yet, on January 25, 2007, Uruguay provocatively decided to cross the line and signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States, making sure its MERCOSUR partners understood it was a preliminary step toward the signing of a free trade agreement that could jeopardize the regional integration process.

However if MERCOSUR's left turn has led to some changes, it is precisely in the realm of addressing the asymmetry issue. As we saw, in the wake of the Argentine crisis, MERCOSUR's leaders were willing

to revigorate the integration process, and in this context emerged the idea of creating a European style structural fund. Two important Brazilian political figures were instrumental in shaping and pushing the idea. Marco Aurelio García, President Lula's diplomatic advisor and long time "guru," and Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, were both very sympathetic to Uruguay's frustration. The two had Lula's attention, but had a hard time convincing the Brazilian diplomats, who were firmly opposed to any kind of redistributive device in the framework of MERCOSUR. Moreover, both knew that a redistributive policy at a regional level would be difficult politically to accept in Brazil. This country has huge regional inequalities of its own and its priority has always been to promote development in its backward northern areas. The representatives from this region would probably question the opportunity to deviate resources from their regions in order to channel them toward Paraguay.

The idea of allowing MERCOSUR to cross the threshold of positive integration eventually prevailed. In 2004, Decision 33/04 created a \$360,000 Fund for Education (FEM). FEM is MERCOSUR's first allocative policy, aimed at financing educative projects reinforcing the regional integration process. The Fund is constituted by member and associate member states' contributions, with quotas proportional to school enrollment. Interestingly, following up the arguments developed in chapter seven, a group of nine civil society organizations in Argentina suggested the creation of a MERCOSUR Educative Forum. The idea was accepted by the Argentine government, at that time assuming MERCOSUR's Presidency, and the first Forum took place in Buenos Aires on June 10–11, 2004. The objective was to debate about ways to promote equity and inclusion in the region. The Forum was then institutionalized and now constitutes a deliberative arena accompanying MERCOSUR's initiatives in the realm of education.

In the same year the CMC took Decision 19/04 that created a High Level Group on Structural Convergence and Integration Financing (GANCEFI).³⁵ Its objective was to think of "initiatives and programs" to improve MERCOSUR's competitiveness, targeting the less advanced regions, and securing stable financing in order to strengthen MERCOSUR's institutions.

GANCEFI was composed of the members of the Commission of Permanent Representatives (CRPM), at that time presided over by Argentine ex-president Eduardo Duhalde, including representatives of ministers of economy and foreign affairs and members of the Secretariat. It met for the first time on August 24, 2004, with a loaded

agenda. Several questions had to be addressed simultaneously. One was the MERCOSUR Secretariat's budget. At that time, with a budget of \$1 million and 24 agents, MERCOSUR's Secretariat looked emaciated compared to Latin American Integration Association's (ALADI), with \$4.5 million and 100 agents, or CAN's, with \$7 million and 180 agents. The fact that ALADI's building is located in Montevideo a few blocks away from MERCOSUR's Secretariat facilitated the comparison. During the first meeting, an amount of \$10 million was evoked by Argentina to match up with the other organizations. Other than the Secretariat, GANCEFI had also to decide what other organs should be financed. By Decision 17/04, a special \$50,000 fund had been created to pay for MERCOSUR's tribunals, but no other institution was granted funds, and we already mentioned in the preceding chapter how financial restrictions severely affected the working groups' meetings. The debate focused mainly on whether to include the Economic-Social Forum (FCES) and the Joint Parliamentary Commission (CPC), the dominant opinion was that it should be so. Next, the question of the overall amount of the fund was examined, and whether this fund should be supported by the member states or by some sort of tax on the common external tariff (CET), and who would manage it.

This first meeting basically served to exchange opinions and circumscribe the agenda. During the second meeting, on October 5, 2004, the Argentines made two proposals. One was that the fund should be of \$80 million, and the other that the CET should be increased by half a point to finance it without undermining MERCOSUR's competitiveness. This amount would be discussed later, but the latter idea did not convince the other negotiators and was finally rejected during the third meeting, on October 20, where the principle of government appropriations was adopted. Interestingly, during this third meeting, each member country presented a series of "draft priority structural objectives." Paraguay, supposedly the country that should have been most concerned by structural funds, did not submit precise proposals, but suggested a methodology to select projects. Argentina put the emphasis on economic reconversion of regions affected by industrial decline or elimination of foot-and-mouth disease, Brazil on social infrastructure, food safety, and familial agriculture, and Uruguay on transborder cooperation.

These first proposals are interesting because they show that every country had in mind its own economic problems and thought of using a regional fund to address its social problems. However they all made

efforts to target their most underdeveloped regions and imagine ways of boosting their competitiveness.

It was during the fourth meeting, on November 9, that the countries' respective contributions were discussed. Two proposals were submitted. One from Argentina suggested strictly sticking to each country's proportion of the regional GDP. In which case, Brazil would have to provide 71.6% of the fund, Argentina 25.3%, Uruguay 1.7%, and Paraguay 1.4%. Brazil made a counterproposal of an adjusted proportionality, with Brazil 60%, Argentina 30%, and Uruguay and Paraguay 5% each.

It has been outlined that for Brazil, the whole idea of contributing to a regional fund in order to help the poorest regions catch-up seemed absurd. By any standards, Brazil, by far MERCOSUR's richest country, is also the country with the poorest regions. Hence from a logical point of view, Brazil could end up contributing to a fund that would eventually be used by its own northern regions. Some in Brazil voiced their concerns and made it clear that the country would be better off using the funds for redistributive purpose of its own. During the debates, the issues of regional development were rarely addressed. A logic of intergovernmental bargaining prevailed without much consideration for the general interest.

Brazil's proposal infuriated the smallest countries. Paraguay even announced that it did not have any intention of contributing to the fund, but only helping with the institutions' financing. It then conditioned its participation on the guarantee that it would receive a great chunk of the allocated funds. And Paraguay insisted that along with the repartition of contributions, the member countries should also agree on the way the fund will be distributed among them.

The decision-making procedure has also been the motive of fierce debates. Brazil and Argentina insisted on a the-bigger-the-contribution-the-more-votes principle, contrary to Paraguay's opinion.

Way before GANCEFI concluded its work, the CMC decided (Decision 45/04) on December 12, 2004 to create a Fund for the Structural Convergence of MERCOSUR (FOCEM) and instructed GANCEFI to make a final proposal by May, 2005.

On the basis of GANCEFI's work, on June 19, 2005, the CMC took its Decision 18/05, bringing some precisions to FOCEM's operating mode. Decision 18/05 insisted in its preamble that "in order to ensure the consolidation of the convergence process toward a common market, it is necessary to impulse the integration process,

reinforcing the principle of solidarity.” It also put the emphasis on competitiveness. FOCEM will serve to develop four types of programs: (1) Structural convergence; (2) Competitiveness; (3) Social cohesion and (4) Strengthening of the institutional structure. Decision 18/05 also closed the debates on a number of issues mentioned above. The fund would amount to \$100 million per year, with fixed contributions and allocations for each country, with an overall distribution that, it is fair to say, represented a sacrifice for Brazil and a bonus for the smallest countries (figure 8.1).³⁶ Decision 18/05 left the door open for additional funding, from international donors for example. It also stipulated that the beneficiaries’ countries must contribute 15% of the total amount allocated to a specific project. Finally, this decision instructed GANCEFI to conclude its work elaborating the FOCEM’s rules of procedure, which it did, and the CMC on December 8, 2005 took Decision 24/05 to enforce it.

Decision 24/05 is interesting because it entitles MERCOSUR’s Secretariat to manage the fund, representing a clear victory for Uruguay. This country wanted the Montevideo-based Secretariat to centralize FOCEM’s management, as a way to strengthen the Secretariat and further position Montevideo as the capital of MERCOSUR. Argentina, on the contrary, wanted to avoid any excessive bureaucratization of the Secretariat. The final decision created in the Secretariat a special FOCEM technical unit (UTF/SM). However, as tends to happen in MERCOSUR, each step forward, allegedly allowing institutions to cross the line of supranationality, is followed by two steps backward. This tango-style type of decision-making entailed, in the case of FOCEM, the creation of national technical units (UTNF). In each country, the UTNF would be responsible for “internal coordination of aspects related to formulation, presentation, evaluation and implementation of the projects.”³⁷

The agreed-upon procedure of project selection is quite complex and goes as follows. First, each UTNF presents its projects to the Commission of Permanent Representatives (CRPM). The CRPM checks their eligibility with the help of an ad hoc group of experts, and sends them to the UTF/SM for a technical evaluation. Then the UTF/SM sends back its remarks to the CRPM who write a report that is subsequently sent to the GMC. The GMC has thirty days to write its own report which is then sent to the CMC for a final decision.

This decision-making process has two interesting features. One is the multiplication of filters or veto points. If the objective was to preserve an intergovernmental logic, it is more than achieved. At every

stage, there is potential for intergovernmental bargaining and political control. It remains to be seen how the process is put to work, though. The fact that every country has a fixed share of the pie will probably lower the stakes. The second interesting feature is the conditionality. At every step of the way, the different organs are supposed to evaluate the eligibility of the project, along certain lines. Of particular interest among the conditions of eligibility are the impact on the environment and a social rate of return (*tasa de rentabilidad social*). The idea that the projects FOCEM funds have to be environmental and socially friendly is quite an innovation for MERCOSUR, and for the regional integration processes in the Americas.

Following the rules, the first pilot projects were approved on January 18, 2007 (Decision 08/07). They were mainly Paraguayan and Uruguayan projects for infrastructure or small businesses, agriculture and livestock (table 8.4).

Some other projects were approved later in 2007, like on drinkable water in Paraguayan indigenous communities (CMC Decision 47/07) or road improvements in Paraguay (CMC Decision 48/07).

Since FOCEM was conceived as a redistributive policy to allow the smallest economies to catch up, it does not come as a surprise to see Paraguay presenting projects that are substitutes for its own social policies. Projects in infrastructure such as road improvements are more likely to yield regional positive externalities but in general, Paraguay will in the future probably consider FOCEM like any other source of

Table 8.4 FOCEM's pilot projects

<i>Type of Program</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Fund</i>
Social housing	Paraguay	\$ 12 million
Social housing	Paraguay	\$ 9,7 million
Road improvement	Paraguay	\$ 14,9 million
Small size business	Paraguay	\$ 5 million
Food safety	Paraguay	\$ 4,8 million
Road improvement	Uruguay	\$ 7,9 million
Biotechnology	Uruguay	\$ 1,5 million
Border development	Uruguay	\$ 1,6 million
Foot-and-mouth disease	Uruguay	\$ 16 million
Information system on the Common external tariff	MERCOSUR's Secretariat	\$ 50,000
Legal database	MERCOSUR's Secretariat	\$ 50,000

Source: CMC Decision 08/07.

international cooperation, without much concern for MERCOSUR's general interest.

It should also be underlined that other than FOCEM, MERCOSUR has been working on the development gap with other tools. In 2006, Decision 34/06 instructed Uruguay and Paraguay to make proposals about the best ways to overcome asymmetries. A year later, CMC Decision 33/07 called the "Strategic plan to overcome asymmetries" created a high-level group (GANASIM) with the mission of designing objectives based on the principles of solidarity, complementarity, and good practices. Among the issues GANASIM have to address are the inland geographical position of Paraguay and ways to open up its economy, the improvement of smaller economies' competitiveness, trade facilitation measures, and institutional strengthening.

It is of course too soon to try to foresee to what extent this strategy will contribute to closing the development gap in MERCOSUR, but it is not a wild bet to imagine it will be a modest progress. The gap between the global giant economy of Brazil and the tiny ones of Uruguay and Paraguay will of course never be closed.

Knowingly, the move toward addressing the issue of asymmetries was a political one, aimed at sympathizing with Uruguay and Paraguay's often bitterly expressed claims. In that sense, FOCEM looks more like a side-payment from Brazil to the smallest partners, without risking a drift away from intergovernmental logic. The way FOCEM is structured does not make MERCOSUR move on toward deeper integration. Since there is a fixed repartition of the funds on a national basis, the main beneficiaries basically have access to a new source of financial assistance.

Yet, the importance of FOCEM should not be underestimated. FOCEM represents the first redistributive policy of the integration process in Latin America. There has been allocation of funds in other integration processes, in Central America, the Andes, or even in MERCOSUR. But FOCEM is redistributing \$100 million every year and even if it only represents a very small proportion of the regional GDP (about 0.04%),³⁸ it is an important precedent. FOCEM is an experiment in positive integration, not just the usual reactive integration as the backdrop to external incentives.

P A R T 5

The Contentious Politics of Integration

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CHAPTER NINE

Regional Multilevel Governance in the Americas?

As previously mentioned, the 1990s have witnessed an amazing reactivation of regional integration in the Americas. In addition to the relaunching of older processes in Central America and in the Andes, and the initiation of new ones in North America (NAFTA) and the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), the overall panorama became increasingly complex following the 1994 Summit of the Americas and the subsequent opening of hemispherical negotiations. At that time, conventional wisdom was that all the different existing integration processes would converge. A decade later, the project of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was stalemated, but the Summit of the Americas Process was alive, tentatively addressing a growing number of issues. In parallel, reacting to the frustration caused by the failed FTAA, the United States started to negotiate bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Venezuela, on its side, chose to oppose the FTAA, offering the Latin Americans a “Bolivarian Alternative” (ALBAN).

The image of a spaghetti bowl, so often put forward by the economists, seems more relevant than ever. For political scientists, this complex picture raises two series of questions. One consists in examining the type of governance that is being installed. Are there competing jurisdictions? Are there fragmented, overlapping, or crosscutting levels of governance? The other consists in unveiling the symbolic importance of summit diplomacy. What if problem-solving was not the main preoccupation of the presidents when they meet? These two ways of looking at presidential summits are not mutually exclusive.

After an introductory discussion on how the different Schools studying regimes and governance can illuminate the FTAA negotiations, this chapter is composed of four sections. In the first one, I portray the way the Summit process was framed in 1994 by an ideal of convergence and how it rapidly bumped into severe problems. The increasing political polarization of the continent did not however prevent successive summits of the Americas from being held, apparently confirming the hypothesis of ceremonial regionalism proposed by Veronica Montecinos.¹ I discuss this dimension in section two. In the third section, I examine the competing projects in the post FTAA era, and show that they are shaped by the two most active players in the field, the United States and Venezuela. That leads me, in a fourth section, to tackle the issue of hegemony and counterhegemony, before concluding with a classification of the different models of integration.

Integration and Governance

In this section, I show that the notion of governance can help us to better understand the complex web of decision-making processes that are being put in place in the Americas. Before this notion became fashionable in the social sciences, for better or for worse, the concept of the international regime had proven to be useful.

Stephen Krasner's classical and widely cited definition of international regimes as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations"² is interesting because it helps capturing a wide array of situations, involving different actors. In a way, the definition of regional integration used in this book pursues the same objective. It has been shown that the studies of regimes belonged to three schools, realist, neoliberal, and cognitivist, each one divided into subcategories.³ The realist and neoliberal approaches share the same rationalist way of analyzing international negotiations between states, the cognitivist one being more concerned with the social construction of national preferences. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger rightly point out that the neoliberal and realist approaches can be alternatively used, depending on the context, while the cognitivist one (in its weak version) refers generally to a preliminary stage of the negotiation.

If I take a look at the Summits of the Americas process, each of the three approaches allows me to highlight a particular dimension

of the negotiations. The neoliberal one seems to be appropriate in accounting for the States' interest-driven motivations to negotiate a Free trade agreement. The United States for instance changed its agenda of trade policy during the second Reagan administration, with the 1988 Trade and competitiveness act, and turned to regionalism as a substitute for GATT's failure to significantly advance worldwide liberalization. The objective was to allow the big multinationals in the service sector to conquer new markets, hence the insistence on intellectual property being placed on top of the agenda. As far as NAFTA is concerned, the Canadians and Mexicans also had interests at stake. Canada had already locked-in its liberal shift during the Mulroney era, signing a Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA). Mexico looked to NAFTA's negotiations for the same result. Mexican president Salinas was keen to consolidate the liberal reforms being implemented at the end of the 1980s. As for the rest of Latin America, some countries, most notably the bigger ones, were clearly looking for commercial gains when they welcomed the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Of course, this is much less so for the smaller economies, which already had access to such programs as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), allowing them to export duty-free to the U.S. market.⁴ For these poorer countries, the neoliberal approach encounters its limits, as they are more interested in inequalities and development gaps and will ask for compensations, an issue the realists are more familiar with. However, there is one interest all Latin American countries shared. All of them wanted to secure a trade conflict resolution mechanism that would protect them from unilateral U.S. retaliations. This uncertainty reduction point is rightly underlined by Keohane's contractualist approach.

The realist school has valuable tools which help understand the structure of the negotiations. Between 1994 and 1998, a series of problems had to be solved in order to get set for the negotiation. It took four ministerial meetings to find common ground.⁵

One issue was the number of actors involved. The United States wanted every country to negotiate on its own, while the Latin Americans favored a collective negotiation with each custom union talking as one. This latter solution was finally chosen, reducing the number of negotiators from thirty-four to eighteen. The Ministers agreed that "Countries may negotiate and accept the obligations of the FTAA individually or as members of a sub-regional integration group negotiating as a unit."⁶ A second issue was the pace and sequence of negotiations. The United States was pushing for a quick opening

of trade facilitation talks, starting with tariff reductions. Brazil on its side preferred postponing the tariff reduction talks until the end of the negotiations, as they involved greater sacrifices on Latin America's part.⁷ MERCOSUR's priority was to start with non-tariff obstacles to market access for their agricultural products, where the United States was expected to offer resistance. They all resolved that the negotiations would "begin simultaneously in all issue areas." Finally, the most complex issue was related to the conclusion of the negotiation. The United States defended the option of signing partial agreements, while the Latin Americans, under the leadership of Brazil, favored a package deal. They were obviously afraid that the U.S. negotiators would push to rapidly close a deal on tariffs, and then indefinitely paralyze the talks on non-tariffs barriers. On that point, they agreed that "the initiation, conduct and outcome of the negotiations of the FTAA shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking which will embody the rights and obligations as mutually agreed upon."⁸

During this initial phase (1994–1998), the negotiation was shaped by power politics. Brazil assumed an undisputed leadership for Latin America, while the U.S. negotiators were weakened by the absence of fast track authority. Bargaining theories illuminate every step of this preparatory phase, including the compensations granted to smaller countries. The San José Joint Declaration mentioned that "Special attention should be given to the needs, economic conditions (including transition costs and possible internal dislocations) and opportunities of smaller economies, to ensure their full participation in the FTAA process."⁹ However, the negotiation was a complex game, with moving coalitions. Richard Feinberg called it "cascading modular multilateralism," a blend of bilateralism, geography-based plurilateralism and issue-specific coalition building.¹⁰ A final feature that can be explained by neoliberal and realist approaches is clearly the distribution of the Negotiating Groups chairs and vice-chairs, as well as the Chairmanship of the whole FTAA process. The main actors, the United States and MERCOSUR, secured full control of the process right until its conclusion in 2005 (table 9.1).¹¹

Neoliberal and realist approaches can be usefully supplemented by the cognitivist one, in order to understand the choices of issue areas, or more broadly the national preferences defended by the different countries. The nine issue areas selected (table 9.1) were almost all of them suggested by the United States, under the pressure of private interests that had managed to have them included in the NAFTA Treaty.¹² There is one exception though. Agriculture was included in the NAFTA

Treaty (Chapter 7) but inserted in its Part II on “Trade in Goods.” Brazil succeeded in having it treated separately, defending the interests of its agribusiness sector.

Cognitivism is also an invitation to consider ideas as independent variables. I will get back in the next section to the common perception that the post cold war era would be a time of shared values and interests across the north south divide. Richard Feinberg’s testimony is illuminating, when he refers to the “spirit of Airlie House” and explains that “the ascendancy of hemispherism and intellectual convergence around important political and economical values, accompanied by the end of the cold war, had created the right preconditions.”¹³

Most of the literature on international regimes is concerned with explaining how a collective action can emerge among a group of countries. The different schools evoked help grasping the conditions and characteristics of the negotiations, including their failure. In comparison, scholarly efforts using the notion of governance are more concerned with the way decisions are taken and the outcomes they deliver. They can also help understand the resilience of a decision-making procedures’ network after the failure of the main negotiation. In the case under examination in this chapter, the Summit of the Americas’ process did survive the deadlock of the FTAA negotiations.

A pioneer in this field, James Rosenau uses the term governance in a very broad sense, referring to “mechanisms for steering social systems toward their goal.”¹⁴ Since he considers such “systems of rule at all levels of human activity—from the family to the international organization,”¹⁵ it can easily be applied to a regional integration process, allowing, taking into account different actors at different levels.

However, a particular type of governance has been described to analyze the complexity of the European Union’s decision-making processes: multilevel governance. Gary Marks started using the notion in 1992 to describe a situation where “decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by state executives,” “collective decision-making among states involves a significant loss of control for individual state executives,” and “political arenas are interconnected rather than nested.”¹⁶

The model convincingly described four sequential phases of policymaking: policy initiation, decision making, implementation, and adjudication.

In a later work, expanding beyond Europe, Marks and Hooghe define governance as “binding decision making in the public sphere” and make an interesting distinction between two types of multilevel

governance, arising from dispersion of authority. Type I multilevel governance is general-purpose, with every citizen being “located in a Russian Doll set of nested jurisdictions, where there is one and only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale.” Type II multilevel governance is specialized, and “the number of such jurisdictions is potentially huge, and the scales at which they operate vary finely.”¹⁷ The two ideal-types differ along four lines: general-purpose *v.* task-specific; non-intersecting memberships versus intersecting memberships; jurisdictions at a limited number of levels *v.* no limit to the number of jurisdictional levels; and system-wide architecture versus flexible design.

The concept of multilevel governance can be criticized on several grounds.¹⁸ Suffice it to say that many of its users insist on the diffusion of authority in a way that tends to erase all political and hierarchical relationships. The interaction between politics and policies is often neglected and so is the role of entrepreneurs or advocacy coalitions. Worse, regarding international regimes, asymmetries of power are overlooked. In a “bifurcated system”¹⁹ where states coexist with other forms of authority, there can be polycentric policymaking processes at different levels despite the presence of a hegemonic power. This dimension has all too often been forgotten, because most of the scholars studying multilevel governance are focused on the European example. As we shall see in the following sections in this chapter, the Summit of the Americas process has put in place a Type II multilevel governance in the context of U.S. hegemony.

From the Myth of Convergence to the Reality of Divergence

“We cannot recall a time when the opportunities for constructive and sustained cooperation among Western Hemisphere nations have been greater—or when the potential payoffs from such cooperation have been larger. The cold war is over and U.S. policy toward Latin America is no longer shaped and constrained by a preoccupation with security matters. Latin American concerns about U.S. political and economic dominance in the region have subsided, along with fears of unilateral U.S. intervention. Today, across the Americas, we see a convergence of interests and values—focusing on democratic politics, enhanced global competitiveness, and social and economic progress.”²⁰

Right at the end of the cold war, many observers prophesized a new era of convergence in international relations.²¹ U.S. president Bush inaugural address on a gentler world and his Enterprise for the Americas initiative (EIA) received a warm welcome among many Latin American elites. For the first time ever, the whole continent (with the only exception of Cuba) was endorsing democracy and the market as core values and ready to build upon them. Convergence became a “magical word.”²²

Several factors contributed to consolidating the myth of convergence. One is the new methodology of trade-centered integration unanimously adopted by the different processes at the beginning of the 1990s. In MERCOSUR, the Buenos Aires Act (July 6, 1990), signed by recently elected presidents Carlos Menem (Argentina) and Fernando Collor (Brazil), contrasted with previous agreements, most notably the Treaty of integration, cooperation and development (November 29, 1988), as it was much more compatible with the spirit of Bush’s EAI presented a few days before (June 27, 1990). Two weeks before the EAI was heralded, President Bush and his Mexican counterpart Salinas announced their intention to negotiate a free trade agreement. MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and the relaunching of older agreements were all inspired by the Washington Consensus.²³ The convergence was also nourished by the evolution of the institutions, as we saw in chapter four, and by the enlargements of some regional integration processes.

The 1994 Summit of the Americas held in Miami embodied this myth of convergence. Essentially because most Latin American leaders thought this exercise of regionalization with the United States would facilitate their access to the U.S. market, help them get set for multilateral negotiations and lock in their own agenda of liberal reforms, they enthusiastically endorsed U.S. proposals. However, the negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) soon proved to be a road paved with many obstacles. The so-called new (investments, services, intellectual property) and brand new (environment, labor) issues of the trade talks entailed many painful adaptations for the Latin American countries. Moreover, the discipline the U.S. wanted to impose upon its partners was superior to the WTO’s one (dubbed WTO +). As Nicola Philipps rightly points out, “for the U.S., in contrast with Latin America and Caribbean countries, the FTAA project has been less about trade expansion than about instilling a range of trade disciplines in the region which reflect a set of extra-regional and global interests at least as much as they respond to regional priorities.”²⁴

Consider the example of government procurements. No Latin American country was party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) signed in 1994, and no regional grouping included provisions on the matter when the FTAA negotiations were opened in 1998. True, MERCOSUR did create an ad hoc group via its resolution 79/97, but no piece of legislation was adopted. By contrast, the agreements that were negotiated following NAFTA's model, like the G3 (México, Venezuela, Colombia), did include regulations.

The efforts of adaptation required were huge, regarding an issue area considered as top priority by the United States. The United States took the presidency of the negotiating group on government procurement (table 9.1), intending to secure fair and non-discriminating conditions of international competition for its big companies. To have an idea of the scope of adaptation required it is necessary to recall that in Latin America since the 1930s, many countries favored domestic suppliers as a way to promote industrial development. This is particularly true for Brazil, where a State-led conception of economic development has been consolidated over the years. On this matter, the gap between the United States and Brazil was huge.²⁵

Other issues could be mentioned, such as intellectual property, where this type of contrast soon surfaced. While the United States was anxious to push its standards, Brazil was defending its conception of development. Where the United States wanted to make progress on the "new issues," Brazil was concerned with more classical issues like agriculture or subsidies and antidumping. The divergences became even more apparent when the Trade promotion authority act was voted in 2002 by the U.S. Congress, insisting on such issues as environment, labor, services, investments, intellectual property, or market access, but preventing the U.S. administration from conceding much room on agriculture. In parallel, the election of Lula in Brazil meant a reaffirmation of Brazil's defense of national interests and a stronger determination to avoid the dismantlement of its State's capacities to promote development. The consolidation of a more radical group of leaders (in Venezuela, Bolivia, or later in Ecuador and Nicaragua) further undermined the myth of convergence in the continent.²⁶

As a result, the negotiations were paralyzed, and six out of the nine issue areas were removed from the agenda of negotiation and sent back to the WTO.²⁷ After 2005, by all accounts, the FTAA project was dead. The United States had for some time decided to shift to bilateral agreements where the imposition of NAFTA methodology was much easier.

Ceremonial Regionalism in the Americas?

Despite the myth of convergence's crash landing and the FTAA's deadlock, the summit process survived and even prospered. I want to suggest in this chapter that the way this contradiction can be addressed is twofold. As already mentioned in chapter four, there are both a symbolic and an institutional dimension that have to be evoked.

I will start with the symbolic dimension, leaving the institutions for the next section. Latin America during the 1990s has espoused a global evolution toward summit diplomacy. While during the 1980s, Latin American leaders used to meet to try to solve common problems (debt, Central America, drugs, etc.), developing what could be called a firefighters diplomacy, during the 1990s, their meetings were not issue-centered any longer. The way the Contadora Group was joined by a support group and later became the Rio Group epitomized this transformation.²⁸ Pragmatic regionalism was replaced by ceremonial regionalism. The main function of the Summits has become twofold. On one side, they embody the unification of the Latin American family and the spirit of brotherhood. The symbolic function of the photo-opportunity ought not be discarded.²⁹ An example of such a display of harmony has been provided by the Brasilia Summit of May 23, 2008. The official motive was the signing of the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR)'s founding treaty. However, in the midst of regional turmoil following the March 1, 2008, Colombian military incursion in the Ecuadorian territory and the destruction of a FARC guerilla's camp, the photos showing smiling presidents hugging each other were comforting.³⁰ A few weeks before, the Santo Domingo Summit of the Rio Group was the theater for a spectacular handshake between Colombian president Uribe and Hugo Chávez, symbolizing the Bolivarian spirit of fraternity against all odds.³¹

The second symbolic function of this diplomacy of summits has also already been mentioned in chapter five. The expansion of the summits agenda's scope allows the presidents to send a signal to their constituency, regarding the need in an era of globalization to transfer problem-solving capacities to the regional level. This postulated governability upgrade might not be grounded but it seeks to produce reality effects.

Following that logic, the summits are quite prolific and the topics addressed very diversified. However, interestingly enough, each summit seems to be rather specialized. A study conducted by FLACSO Chile has shown that during the 1990s, the Ibero-American Summits, together with the Rio Group and the Summits of the Americas took a

Table 9.2 Summits' Decisions in the Different Issue Areas, 1990–1999

<i>Issue Areas</i>	<i>Summits of the Americas</i>	<i>Ibero-American Summits</i>	<i>Rio Group Summits</i>
Politics	31%	33%	22%
Social	37%	26%	17%
Economics	17%	12%	29%
International	15%	28%	31%
Others	0%	1%	1%

Source: Author's elaboration using data from FLACSO Chile (http://www.ftaa-alca.org/spcomm/soc/Contributions/BAires/csw153_s.asp/), accessed on June 6, 2008.

total of 1,113 decisions, against only 84 for the Asia-Pacific Economic Caucus (APEC). The three summits were also much more politicized than APEC's ones, which are almost exclusively dedicated to trade-related issues³² (table 9.2 and figure 9.1).³³

The Rio Group Summits were mainly concerned with international topics, which is coherent with its history. Born out of the Central American crisis, the Rio Group has never had much more ambition than to become a political forum. By contrast, the Ibero-American summits have political issues on the top of their agendas. The recurrent debates about Cuba and the Spanish's obsession with triggering a democratic transition in the island can help explain this politicization. Finally, the summits of the Americas have placed great importance on social and political issues. The 1994 "Partnership for prosperity and development" has put the emphasis on poverty reduction, inequalities, and promotion of democracy. The FTAA's project has received great attention in the media, yet it never monopolized the agenda of the summits.

Regional Multilevel Governance: Agendas, Institutions, and Outcomes

Most of these summits have created institutions. In this section, I will exclusively focus on the Summit of the Americas process.³⁴ The preparation of the first Summit of the Americas kept U.S. vice president Al Gore quite busy during the year 1994. The issues he had in mind when traveling to Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil in March 1994, namely sustainable development and good governance, were not opposed by his hosts, but they pushed other issues such as trade, poverty reduction,

education, and drugs. In a typical diplomatic exercise, Gore progressively added new issues to his initial short list, the total number jumping from fourteen to nineteen. At the end, the Plan of Action adopted in Miami listed twenty-three initiatives and more than a hundred and fifty action items, grouped into four general objectives: "Preserving and strengthening the community of democracies of the Americas," "Promoting prosperity through economic integration and free trade," "Eradicating poverty and discrimination in our hemisphere," and "Guaranteeing sustainable development and conserving our natural environment for future generation."³⁵

The strong commitment to address the issues and go beyond ceremonial regionalism is what contributed to raising everyone's expectations. This commitment was embodied in the appendix of the Plan of action, where it specified that "The primary responsibility for implementing this Plan of Action falls to governments, individually and collectively, with participation of all elements of our civil societies."³⁶ A genuine division of labor was suggested by the presidents: "Existing organizations or institutions are called upon to implement the package of initiatives that has emerged from this Summit of the Americas. In many instances we have proposed that specific issues be examined by meetings of ministers, senior officials, or experts. We are also proposing that some of these initiatives be carried out in partnerships between the public and private sector." The Organization of America States (OAS) was given a "paramount role," while the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was asked to "support the activities specified in the Plan of Action," and other organizations such as CEPAL and the Pan-American Health Organization (OPAS) were "called-upon to assist in the implementation of the action items." And finally, a list of "initiatives in which public and private sector partnership play an important role" was included.

This appendix of the Plan of action set the base of a methodology that is very close to type II multilevel governance, as defined previously, with some specificities worth mentioning. The Summit process's governance did not entail the creation of new institutions, except for some high level meetings and conferences. Rather, it got a great diversity of actors involved in the mandates' implementation, prolonging their participation in the Summit's preparation. One of the Miami Summit peculiarities was the involvement of the private sector and some NGOs contrasting with the absence of trade unions.

Richard Feinberg described this governance as a renewed Inter-American system, with three pillars: the traditional system with OAS,

IADB, and CEPAL; ministerial meetings with the involvement of many official agencies; and public—private partnership.³⁷ However there is a last feature that has to be mentioned. This form of governance is one of variable geometry, each issue being addressed by a specific configuration of actors. In this sense, it does not form a stabilized system, although Korzeniewicz and Smith make a good point when they describe two intertwined tracks, one for the FTAA negotiation and one for the Summit process, with the former characterized by opaque negotiations confiscated by the States and the latter characterized by relative transparency and a collaboration between governments, international agencies and regional civil society networks.³⁸ This remark notwithstanding, the Summit process meets the criteria defined by Marks, most notably task-specific decision-making and flexible design.

Two years after Miami, the Bolivian summit on sustainable development was characterized by a strong participation by civil society and opposing conceptions of sustainable development. Some countries did not show up, and the United States was represented by its Vice President Al Gore, so regional governance did not progress. The 1998 Santiago summit was modest in its ambitions. First, because as mentioned earlier in this chapter, it took time to get the FTAA's negotiations started and along the road the myth of convergence vanished. Second, because the years 1994–1998 were not marked by social progress, hence the emphasis put on social issues in Santiago. Nevertheless, the different mandates listed lacked precise and quantifiable objectives, except in the realm of education. Regarding governance, the Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG), created in March 1995, became more active, with the support of OAS, IADB, CEPAL, and OPAS.

The third summit, held in Québec in April 2001, has been the most successful one. The mandates were partially redefined, around eighteen themes,³⁹ and the European style “Troika”⁴⁰ was replaced by a Steering Committee, composed of past, present, and future host countries (United States, Canada, Argentina, and Chile), assisted by an Executive council.⁴¹ Also the SIRG was reformed. Instead of having national coordinators for each issue, it was charged with a follow-up responsibility, with the support of the OAS Office of the summit follow-up. A Secretariat for the Summit process was created composed of the Executive Council, SIRG, and OAS. Finally, this summit was the most transparent one. In an effort to secure accountability of the process, the Canadian government published on the internet the draft of the FTAA agreement.

The process was, by 2001, fully institutionalized and had a rather consensual agenda, yet for a series of reasons mentioned above, the process lost momentum the same year after 9/11. The timing was damaging but not deadly though. Despite the fact that FTAA negotiations were stalemated after 2002, the Summit process kept on going.

During their eighth ministerial meeting (November 20, 2003), the FTAA negotiators tried to keep the project alive, breaking the single undertaking logic by recognizing “the need for flexibility to take into account the needs and sensitivities of all FTAA partners,” and recognizing that “countries may assume different levels of commitments.”⁴² The Monterrey special summit was dedicated to social issues, but without much success.⁴³ The fourth summit, held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in 2005, was contaminated by political frictions between Venezuela and Mexico. Presidents Chávez and Fox clashed on the opportunity to relaunch the FTAA negotiations, the former accusing the latter of being a U.S. puppet. For the first time, the presidents and heads of state were not able to reach common ground on the matter, leaving two options in their final declaration.⁴⁴

Interestingly enough, the political oppositions affected the general climate of the Summit process, but did not freeze the daily work of the different actors implementing the mandates. However, more than ten years after its initial impulse, the Summit process’ balance is not easy to establish. Multilevel governance with no institution building prevents the emergence of a salient actor playing the role of an entrepreneur. Moreover, the involvement of traditional international organizations like OAS or IADB makes it difficult to isolate the added-value of the Summit process. The reports of the Joint Summit Working Group (JSWG), posted on the Internet, tend to include the missions of OAS, IADB and all the other organizations.⁴⁵ They read like a vast and comprehensive synthesis of these organizations’ work.

Consider the example of the mandate “strengthening of democratic governance.” The main achievements over the years have been very much linked to the OAS’ missions: signing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, elections’ monitoring by the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, signing of a Convention against corruption.⁴⁶

The Summit process is a social construction, making sense out of a wide array of different organizations’ missions and claiming credit for the outcomes they deliver. Moreover, it embodies a collective action dynamic, geared at building a consensus and designing a road-map for regional governance of a series of new issues never before addressed at

a regional level, such as corruption, drug trafficking or gender equality. It is also a resource mobilization device, sustaining the momentum for problem-solving at the hemispheric level. And last, it provides the thirty-four members with a voice opportunity, which is far from negligible for the smallest countries, and it allows civil societies to have a say on many topics. However, the Summit process is also characterized by power politics.

Governance, Hegemony, and Counterhegemony

Andrew Hurrell can be followed when he advances that “the Western Hemisphere does represent a fascinating vantage point from which to explore the relationship between hegemonic power and regional institutions and to unpack the complex ways in which logics of regional governance interact with the logic of hegemonic power.”⁴⁷ Indeed, he quite convincingly shows that the 1990s convergence mentioned above was neither the product of learning nor of imposition, but rather of what he calls “coercitive socialization.” This notion allows him to grasp “the ways in which interaction within a highly unequal international system leads to the adoption and incorporation of external ideas, norms and practices.” As regards the summit of the Americas process, he sees it as an example of the “power to set agendas, to decide what gets decided and to mobilize bias.” Clarkson saw NAFTA with the same lenses. According to him, NAFTA, “far from producing a system of continental governance in which Mexico and Canada would have had some influence, has reconstituted American hegemony in the form of an economic rule book that establishes an unevenly liberalized market and a set of supraconstitutional constraints on the policy-making options of both Canada and Mexico.”⁴⁸

However, FTAA's failure has epitomized the incapacity of the United States to secure and consolidate hegemonic stability in the reshaped Inter-American system. The subsequent return to bilateralism has greatly facilitated the imposition of stricter discipline. The FTAs with Chile, Central America and the Dominican Republic, or with Peru, are almost photocopies of NAFTA, but with a stricter WTO+ type of discipline.

The example of Chile is emblematic. As Nicola Phillips points out, “certain concessions were made by the U.S. on market access for agricultural goods [...] but this was not accompanied by any commitments

on the reduction or elimination of subsidies.” Moreover,

the provisions on agricultural market access in the Chile-U.S. agreement were also accompanied by a Trade Remedies chapter which provided for the imposition of temporary safeguards by the U.S. government when increased imports were deemed, *by the U.S. government*, to represent a threat or injury to domestic producers. “Special” safeguards were put in place for a range of textiles and agricultural products and no part of the agreement entailed any sorts of alterations to U.S. laws on trade remedies.

Philipps concludes that “the substance of the U.S.-Chile agreement entailed called forth a number of fundamental changes to Chilean laws and policies and a significant circumscription of Chilean government’s policy-making and legal discretion.”⁴⁹

Testimonies from private sector representatives confirm this picture of the U.S. imposing the agenda and the discipline during the FTA negotiations. As Mario Pujols, a Dominican business leader who participated in the three rounds of RD-CAFTA talks in January–March 2004 puts it, “the U.S. negotiators were really inflexible and defended until the last minute the interests of their producers.”⁵⁰ As we saw in chapter five, the FTAs tend to become “external constitutions” for the countries that sign them.

However, the coercive socialization that leads to the adoption of external constitutions often encounters fierce resistance. In Costa Rica for instance, the ratification of CAFTA issue dominated the 2006 presidential campaign and polarized the country. Oscar Arias, who supported the ratification, barely won and then had to have the treaty approved by referendum. The so-called implementation laws were then strongly opposed by leftist sectors and trade unions, voicing concern about the liberalization in particular of the electricity and telecommunication sectors.

The resistance was even more bitter at the regional level. Venezuela took the initiative to oppose the U.S.-sponsored market-centered conception of regional integration, proposing the aforementioned Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). The idea of ALBA was announced by Hugo Chávez during the December 11–12, 2001 meeting of the Association of Caribbean States in the Island of Margarita. Calling for a revival of the Bolivarian dream of unity, he sketched the lines of a project resting on the principles of solidarity, cooperation, complementarities, and reciprocity. The idea was to

herald a new dawn⁵¹ for the historical endeavor of such nineteenth century leaders as Francisco de Miranda, Miguel Hidalgo, Marina Moreno, Simon Bolivar, José Artigas, Bernardo Monteagudo, Cecilio del Valle, or José Marti. In this sense, the ALBA project is an act of heritage appropriation that also includes twentieth century anti-imperialist combatants such as the Nicaraguan Cesar Sandino in the thirties, or the Argentinean students fight for democracy in Cordoba in 1918.⁵²

Clearly standing in opposition to neoliberalism, the project is more a declaration of intention than a thorough program, with a strong emphasis put on poverty reduction. The whole idea was to invent a form a regionalism not centered on trade but rather on social issues. From another standpoint, it was also about making Venezuelan oil a factor of integration and not division.⁵³ It took some time before the initial proposal managed to be converted into concrete steps. On December 14, 2004, Venezuela and Cuba signed a bilateral agreement in the framework of ALBA and a Strategic Plan, agreed upon on April 28, 2005, started to be implemented.

The Agreement includes such issue areas as productive complementarity, exchange of technology, alphabetization, investments, trade compensation, or culture. The agreement also lists a series of mutual offers. Cuba offers trade facilitation, a number of 2000 scholarships for young Venezuelans, the assistance of 15,000 doctors to help Venezuela implement its Barrio Adentro Mission.⁵⁴ Venezuela, among other things, offers transfers of technology in the energy sector, trade facilitation, and the financing of energy or infrastructure projects.⁵⁵

Basically what this Plan conceived was Cuba's assisting to Venezuela's social "missions," mostly in health and education, in exchange for payment facilities for the supply of oil. Cuban doctors and teachers would constitute the backbone of a new solidarity between the peoples. The Strategic Plan mentions the number of 100,000 Venezuelans to be operated on in Cuba for vision trouble. On its part, Venezuela would offer to share its reserves of oil with its partners, through a series of separate agreements with different countries.⁵⁶ On April 29, 2006, Bolivia decided to join ALBA, and together with Cuba and Venezuela, signed a Trade Agreement for the Peoples (TCP). Again, the agreement is centered on social issues, with Cuba and Venezuela committed to helping Bolivia reduce poverty and educate the poorest sectors of its population. The Plan also includes financial assistance for Bolivian small and medium businesses.⁵⁷

Finally on January 11, 2007, Nicaragua joined ALBA, despite the fact that this country ratified DR-CAFTA, and so did the Caribbean Island of Dominica on January 1, 2008.

ALBA rapidly turned out to be an instrument of coalition building for Chávez, looking for ways to consolidate leadership in Latin America. As such, it failed. Chávez did not manage to rally much support, as even a leftist leader like Rafael Correa in Ecuador did not adhere.

Chávez's intent to lead the reaction against U.S. hegemony in the continent has historical precedents. As Carlos Romero has shown, petro-diplomacy is a tradition in Venezuela.⁵⁸ As far as the years 2000 are concerned, Chávez's ambition contrasted with Brazil's new role as a global player and as a moderator in the hemisphere. Brazilian president Lula has always said that confrontations were outdated, and that all American countries should work together to build consensus and focus on problem solving. True, Brazil has defended its own interests and contributed to the FTAA's failure. However, Lula has insisted that pragmatism should be the name of the game and that the defense of national interests should be compatible with regional governance.

Regarding regional integration, Chávez shot his own project of unifying the continent in the back when he decided to abandon CAN and join the MERCOSUR.⁵⁹ His move was motivated by a will to punish Colombia and Peru for having negotiated a FTA with the United States, but at the same time he declared that MERCOSUR was too neoliberal and had to be reformed. In a way, he managed to weaken the CAN without much pleasing his new MERCOSUR partners.

However, Chávez did contribute to changing the agenda of integration, enlarging its scope to such issues as energy, finance and security. In a way, the treaty of the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR), signed in Brasilia on May 23, 2008, reflects his influence. UNASUR treaty is not so much centered on trade and symbolizes a move toward other issues.

In the three previous South American summits,⁶⁰ different issues had already been included in the agenda, and UNASUR treaty, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, feeds the dynamics of ceremonial regionalism. Yet, UNASUR does not place trade facilitation at the center of its ambitions. Rather, UNASUR aims at building an "integration and union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, prioritizing political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment, among others, with a view to eliminating socio-economic

inequalities, in order to achieve social inclusion and the participation of civil society, to strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries within the framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States.”⁶¹ UNASUR even includes in its agenda the security issue, but without much precision. This topic spurred controversy, as Venezuela was pushing for a NATO-type military alliance, which was strongly opposed by U.S. allies such as Colombia and Peru. Brazil only envisioned a framework of cooperation and exchange of information.

All in all, UNASUR is a rather pragmatic agreement, “flexible and gradual in its implementation, ensuring that each State honors its commitments according to its realities.” It of course remains to be seen if it becomes the backbone of a new integration process, overlapping with the existing ones, such as MERCOSUR and CAN.

Conclusion: Governance and Contentious Integration

Recently, the 2000s have witnessed a contentious politics of regional integration in the Americas, with competing models that have not been able to converge. Using a stylized model, two sets of variables, already mentioned in the previous chapters, allow categorizing the different processes (figure 9.2).⁶²

The processes differ regarding, on one side, their level of integration, measured by their degree of institutionalization and the scope of their agenda and, on the other, the types of actors involved and the projects they push forward.

Each category entails a different type of governance. Ideally, we can expect that the most favorable situation as regards governance would be a balanced regional integration process. This process would imply a degree of institutionalization matching the scope of issue areas included in the agenda, and the participation of different types of actors, building a consensus to implement policies generating regional commons (positive integration). That would be a “magic square” (regardless the level between 1 and 4 on figure 9.2). What figure 9.2 tentatively shows is that each regional integration process in the Americas is characterized by an imbalanced type of governance. As mentioned in previous chapters, CAN and SICA are characterized by complex institutionalizations, overloaded agendas, and the modest involvement of civil societies. Moreover, they face many obstacles when actually trying to implement decisions and cross the threshold of positive integration. CARICOM more or less follows the same pattern, yet with a

more participatory civil society. MERCOSUR has a lower level of institutionalization and a more modest agenda, and above all has innovated with regards to positive integration implementing an incipient redistributive policy. NAFTA and other U.S. sponsored FTAs' main differential feature relies on the private public partnership to implement the mandates. Finally, ALBA possesses an allocative dimension but no regional institution to sustain it.

These imbalanced patterns of regional governance do not preclude the possibility of multilevel hemispherical governance for particular issue areas. What they do, however, is highlight some predictable difficulties in trying to make different processes converge, like UNASUR is scheduled to do.

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Conclusion

This conclusion synthesizes the different theoretical lessons that can be drawn from the chapters of this book, and offers a closing comment on the influence of the “left turn” on regional integration.

Part 1 of the book constituted a unique introductory chapter, sketching a series of historical and theoretical guidelines. First, it briefly characterized Latin American attempts at regional integration with two types of oxymoron: consistency despite instability, resilience despite crises. It then made an effort to suggest a definition bridging different theoretical traditions. Regional integration is thus defined as a historical process of increased levels of interaction between political units (subnational, national, or transnational), provided by actors sharing common ideas, setting objectives and defining methods to achieve them, and by so doing contributing to building a region. There are three corollaries to this definition: (1) the process can encompass a great diversity of actors (private and public), levels (from below and from above), and agendas; (2) It can result from a deliberate strategy or emerge as an unintended consequence of a social interaction; and (3) not least, it can entail institution building.

I admit that this definition can be criticized, on the ground that it can apply to an excessively wide range of situations, yet it proved useful for this inquiry. This introduction also summed up the history of Latin American integration, emphasizing its instability and the gap between objectives, means, and outcomes. Finally, I selected some theoretical tools considered best suited to account for some features of Latin American integration not sufficiently addressed by the literature: imagined political integration long remaining essentially rhetorical; economic, social or cultural integration from below despite many obstacles; integration from above launched at some critical junctures; resilience and consistency of the institutional arrangements despite

instability and crises; mismatch between scope and level of integration; and poor policy outcomes. The discussion has been organized around three basic questions: how and why is a regional integration process launched? How does it evolve? And how can its politics and policies be characterized? The theoretical instruments used draw essentially from historical institutionalism and constructivism, with some references to neo-functionalism. Some variables were highlighted like politicization and external incentives.

The theoretical discussion has supplemented the initial definition and its three corollaries. Concerning the onset of the process, I found that: (1) the increase in the level of interaction does not happen "from scratch." History matters (critical junctures, environment and negotiations); (2) the initial objectives and methods can be diverse, economic as well as political; (3) they rely on a convergence of ideas among a variety of actors; and (4) there can be endogenous as well as external incentives. Concerning the evolution of the integration process, (1) There can be permutations of objectives and crossed instrumentalizations between economy and politics; (2) The process entails politicization and the consideration of common interest in specific historical junctures, but there is no irreversibility; (3) Institution building is crafted by ideas and models; (4) Mismatches between scope and level of integration can fulfill a symbolic function. Finally, as regards the policies and politics of integration, regional integration processes are no exception in the context of a worldwide demand for democracy and accountability in the international organizations. The issue can be raised at two levels: (1) In the different regional arrangements, there are attempts to reform the institutions so that they can be more representative, participative and redistributive/allocative; and (2) At the interregional level (Latin America/United States and Latin America/European Union), a multi-level governance is being build.

Part 2 of the book was concerned with the political instrumentalization of regional economic integration.

Chapter two examined a first instrumentalization, namely the way regional integration processes are associated with crisis-resolution efforts. A brief theoretical discussion has allowed us to make the following theoretical points: (1) Highlighting the critical juncture that triggers an integration process (launching or relaunching) allows better understanding of the type of integration that follows, especially the balance between economic and political objectives; (2) A critical juncture must be described in terms of "linkage politics." International contexts, domestic politics, as well as their interactions

matter; (3) Sequencing of events is of great importance; (4) Critical junctures leave historical legacies, mainly through institutions and representations. Institutions usually survive over time, but they can be deprived of influence, and the learning effect of past experiences progressively fades away; (5) Subsequent crises resolutions are constrained by path dependency, but they can nonetheless act as new critical junctures, partially erasing the past and engaging regional integration on a new path. The chapter proves the validity of these arguments, studying Central America in the 1950s and 1980s.

Chapter three examined a second instrumentalization, the way a regional integration process can help defending and consolidating democracy. The chapter opened with a theoretical discussion showing that democracy can be a favorable condition for regional integration, but not a sufficient one. It also stressed that, conversely, integration can help consolidate democracy, thanks to constraining institutional arrangements and the shaping of actors' behaviors. The chapter went on to highlight the European example, insisting on four variables: initial juncture, spill over, conditions of eligibility and socialization. The Latin American experiences are studied putting the emphasis first on their politicization, or lack of it, showing that the 1980s marked a turning point. The case of MERCOSUR is studied to show how the new generation of agreements was born out of a preoccupation concerning the fragility of democracy. However, the 1991 Treaty of Asunción, due to the 1990 neoliberal turn in the region, the regional diffusion of democracy and U.S. influence, does not carry any provisions regarding the defense of democracy. The issue resurfaced in 1996 with a coup attempt in Paraguay and since then the MERCOSUR, as well as other agreements, include a democratic clause. The chapter concludes that democratic clauses can act as deterrents because of reputational effects, but they are not adapted to the present day threat of political instability.

Part 3 of the book was dedicated to the study of the design and development of institutions.

In chapter four, I addressed the issue of institution building. Theoretically, regional integration processes, even limited to free trade areas, can entail very different levels of institutionalization. Discussing that point, I suggested pushing further DiMaggio and Powell's theory of institutional isomorphism, as considering the way regional institutional arrangements mirror domestic formal and informal institutions. I then turned to case studies, focusing first on Andean and Caribbean institutional luxuriance and, conversely, on MERCOSUR's institutional

modesty. For a series of reasons, MERCOSUR could not hold to its initial intentions and witnessed an accelerated proliferation of agencies without crossing the line of supranationality. Every process followed the same trend: increasing institutional complexity coexisting with a concentration of power in the hands of the presidents. I explain this convergence with a domestically-inspired mimetism.

In chapter five, I turned to the scope and level of integration and tried to explain a widely recognized mismatch. I started by discussing Schmitter's theory of "crisis-provoked decisional cycles" leading to "encapsulation," suggesting improving it with two incentives, external and symbolic. The example of Central America is examined at length to illustrate this theoretical proposition and validate it, describing external incentives and what I called an umbrella-race leading to an endless expansion of the integration agenda. I then supplemented this study with a quantitative analysis of MERCOSUR and CAN's decisions, showing the diversification of the agenda over the years. Finally, the example of NAFTA is used to examine the scope and level of integration as independent variables, discussing the hypothesis of NAFTA as an external constitution for Mexico and Canada.

Part 4 of the book tackled the issue of democracy in, and democratization of, a regional integration process. I did so from three perspectives: representative, participatory, and redistributive democracy.

Chapter six focused on the parliamentary option, and started examining the logic that led the European Union to change its assembly into an elected parliament, progressively granting it decision-making prerogatives. I then described the different Latin American forums of deliberation and the three regional parliaments (in Central America, the Andes and the Caribbean), examining in more details the reforms that led to the creation of a Parliament in the MERCOSUR. While analyzing the main features of the new Parliament, I speculate regarding the latter's possible future importance in the integration process. The Parliament has not been awarded any decision-making capacity, yet much depends on the way the new "merco-parliamentarians" will make use of the institution, using formal and informal rules. The chapter closes looking at the first members' profiles and concludes that their geographical origin and political weight could mean some commitment.

Chapter seven addressed the issue of democratization "from below." I start by reflecting on the reasons why non-state actors can get involved in transnational activities and distinguish between different types of involvement, whether driven by interests, values, or politics. I then

analyze a series of spontaneous events, essentially in Central America and MERCOSUR. In both regions, many local initiatives for integration have been created by a wide variety of actors. Yet, the official organs tend to ignore them. I also describe framed modes of participation, and conclude on a skeptical note regarding the literature on regional civil society.

In chapter eight I consider a democratized regional integration process as a system favoring the general interest, producing regional public goods, and as being held accountable by the citizenry. A theoretical discussion leads me to apply this outcome-centered conception of democracy at three levels, raising three questions: (1) is solidarity a core value of the integration process? (2) are there any regional public goods produced? And (3) are there any allocative or redistributive common policies? After revising the emblematic but complex case of the European Union, the Latin American cases are scrutinized. Particular attention is given to MERCOSUR's recent redistributive policy. Despite its defaults, MERCOSUR's structural funds definitively represent a step forward in the direction of trying to provide regional goods.

Part 5 of the book made an incursion into the study of regionalism at the hemispherical level.

Chapter nine has tested two different but not mutually exclusive hypotheses about the Summit of the Americas Process: (1) Ceremonial regionalism and (2) Multilevel governance. After a discussion of the different ways of studying how international regimes and governance contribute to a better understanding of the Miami Process, the chapter shows that the summits fulfill a symbolic function, allowing the presidents to send signals to their constituencies about their spirit of solidarity and the relevance of problem-solving at the international level at a time of domestic problems of governability. Hence, the agendas of the summits are quite overloaded. I then turn to the Summit of the Americas process and shows that a new inter-American system is being installed, looking like Marks' Type II Multilevel governance. The chapter concludes that there are competing models of integration and overlapping jurisdictions, and suggests a typology using two sets of variables (scope/level and actors/projects). However, the United States has been successfully imposing a discipline on the continent for a wide variety of issue areas.

The introduction of this book discarded any attempt to speculate about the next steps of Latin American integration process. Yet, the overall swing to the left following the 2005–2006 electoral cycle¹ has

brought about an unusual political situation. Most of the new presidents had promised a reactivation of regional integration during their campaign. Did they deliver? Are we in the presence of a new critical juncture, capable of triggering a third phase in the postwar history of regional integration?

There is wide scope to doubt it. Nowhere more than in MERCOSUR are the limitations of leftist pro-integration rhetoric so obvious. The clash between Argentina and Uruguay over the paper mills epitomizes MERCOSUR's weakness, from an institutional and above all political standpoint. Chapter four mentioned 2004's lost opportunity to make the integration process a decisive move toward deeper integration (Ouro Preto II reform). In MERCOSUR, a previously unsuspected leftist nationalism has proven to be as paralyzing as the 1990s neoliberal focus on trade-centered integration.

As the first decade of the 2000s comes to an end, it is the radical left which is putting the integration process on a new track. Interestingly enough, despite a marked tendency to use the eternal Bolivarian rhetoric of unity and brotherhood, Hugo Chávez has proved to be very pragmatic, using oil diplomacy to reshape the map of integration.

However, as mentioned in chapter nine, the new born Union of South American Nation (UNASUR) that Chávez has contributed to forge, is a strange mixture of a renewed agenda of integration, putting the emphasis on infrastructure, energy, security and social issues, and old habits of over-institutionalization. It remains to be seen if UNASUR can secure a convergence of MERCOSUR and CAN. However, it can be forecasted that without a strong political commitment, UNASUR will become yet another decorative device and will not allow Latin America to close the traditional gap between a "We have to downgrade our level of expectations"² type of discourse and the overambitious institutional arrangements. Hopefully this book will have helped the reader understand why this probable new disappointment will not come as a surprise.

NOTES

Acknowledgments and Preface and Acronyms

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4. <http://www.opalc.org/> (accessed on April 10, 2009).
5. In the whole book, the acronyms are used in their original language as they appear in this list.

One Historical and Theoretical Guideline

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37. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay. Colombia and Ecuador joined later in 1960, and Venezuela and Bolivia in 1966 and 1967.
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48. Table 1.4 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
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50. Table 1.5 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
51. In a 1967 piece, Joseph Nye described it as follows: "Whether caused by the 'instant friendship' of ill-prepared summit meetings, the search for panaceas, or the deliberate effort to divert attention from internal problems, the most prevalent form of regionalism in less developed areas is an ephemeral expression of the supra-state sense of community without any significant restructuring of interests. This might be called 'token integration' at the international level." (Joseph Nye, "Central American Regional Integration," p. 377 in Joseph Nye [ed.], *International Regionalism*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1968, pp. 377–429).
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53. Puchala, "Of Blind Men," p. 277.
54. Dimitris Chrysochoou, "New Challenges to the Study of European Integration: Implications for Theory-Building," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35(4), December 1997, p. 17.
55. Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America," *International Organization* 18(4), Autumn 1964, p. 737.
56. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, p. 44.
57. Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration*.
58. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Chapter 4, "Creole Pioneers"), London, Verso, 2006, pp. 47–65.
59. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.
60. Luis Tejada Ripalda, "El Americanismo. Consideraciones sobre el Nacionalismo Latinoamericano," *Investigaciones Sociales* 8(12), p. 171.
61. José Caballero, *Problematising Regional Integration in Latin America: Regional Identity and the Enmeshed State. The Case of Central America*, UNU-CRIS Working Papers, W-2007/02, p. 14.
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65. Joseph Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration," *International Organization* 19(4), Autumn 1965, p. 882.
66. Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts," p. 883.
67. Pierson, *Politics in Time*, p. 45.
68. See, for instance, Deutsch noticing that in Europe "men will have to work toward the building of a larger security-community without the benefit of any clear-cut automatic trend toward internationalism to help them" in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, p. 24.
69. James Rosenau (ed.), *Linkage Politics. Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*, New York, Free Press, 1969. Of particular interest is what Rosenau calls "fused linkages," a situation where "certain outputs and inputs continuously reinforce each other and are thus best viewed as forming a reciprocal relationship" (p. 49).
70. Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam (eds.), *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.
71. Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (eds.), *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
72. Andrew Moravcsik, "Theorizing European Integration," *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell university press, 1998 (Chapter 1).
73. Just one example: on September 18, 2007, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte declared that "Failing to pass the FTAs with Peru, Panama and especially Colombia would be a win for Hugo Chávez and a defeat for the forces of democracy in the hemisphere" (<http://www.state.gov/s/d/2007/92433.htm>, accessed on April 30, 2008).
74. Duina, *The Social Construction of Free Trade*.
75. Jean Coussy, "International Political Economy," in Marie-Claude Smouts (ed.), *The New International Relations. Theory and Practice*, London, Hurst, 2001, pp. 140–154.
76. Puchala, "Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration," p. 41.
77. That is prior to the 1965 crisis leading to the compromise of Luxembourg (January 30, 1966).

78. Haas and Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration," p. 707.
79. Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts," p. 872.
80. Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts," p. 881.
81. Haas and Philippe, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration," p. 707.
82. Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21(1/2), 1982, p. 29.
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88. Duina, *The Social Construction of Free Trade*, p. 185.
89. Philippe Schmitter, "Central American Integration: Spill-over, Spill-around or Encapsulation?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 9(1), September 1970, pp. 1-48.
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91. Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, Chatham, UK, Chatham House, 1987, p. 234.
92. Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1998.
93. Andrew Axline, "Latin American Integration: Alternative Perspectives on a Changing Reality," *Latin American Research Review* 16(1), 1981, p. 168.
94. An allusion is made here to John Austin's classical *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962.
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97. Andrew Axline, "Regional Co-operation and National Security: External Forces in Caribbean Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 27(1), September 1988, p. 1.
98. Duina, *The Social Construction of Free Trade*.
99. Caballero, "Problematising Regional Integration in Latin America."
100. Some further discussions are available on the Web site of Sciences Po's Political Observatory of Latin America and the Caribbean: http://www.opalc.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=section&id=9&Itemid=31

Two Resolving Regional Crises

1. Karl Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, and Robert A. Kann, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organizations in the Light of Historical Experiences*, Princeton University Press, 1957.
2. "The emergence of the Russian and American superpowers created a situation that permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation among the states of Western Europe. They became consumers of security." See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Boston, McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 70.
3. Ernst Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization* 15(3), Summer 1961.

4. Ernest Haas and Philippe Schmitter, "Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Political Unity in Latin America," *International Organization* 18(4), Autumn 1964.
5. Karl Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1968.
6. Ernst Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 5(4), June 1967.
7. Or even the not so naïve ones: Ernst Haas admits in his 1967 article that "something is missing in the exploration of the integrative process presented in *The Uniting of Europe*. The phenomenon of a de Gaulle is omitted. De Gaulle has proved us wrong." "Uniting of Europe and Uniting of Latin America," p. 327.
8. Philippe Schmitter, "Three Neo-functional Hypotheses about International Integration," *International Organization* 23(1), Winter 1969, p. 164.
9. Philippe Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," *International Organization* 24(4), Autumn 1970.
10. Engrenage being "the impossibility of maintaining prolonged separability of different issue areas." See Schmitter, "Revised Theory of Regional Integration," p. 840.
11. Philippe Schmitter, "Central American Integration: Spill-over, Spill-around or Encapsulation?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 9(1), 1970.
12. Dorette Corbey, "Dialectical Functionalism: Stagnation as a Booster of European Integration," *International Organization* 49(2), Spring 1995.
13. Corbey, "Dialectical Functionalism," p. 263.
14. Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European Bargain," *World Politics* 42(1), October 1989, p. 97.
15. Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community," *International Organization* 45(1), Winter 1991.
16. The Federal Republic of Central America lasted from 1824 to 1838. Thomas Karnes mentioned eight tentative reconstructions between 1842 and 1863 (Thomas Karnes, *The Failure of Union. Central America, 1824–1960*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1961). Among the subsequent principal attempts to resuscitate it, it is worth mentioning: the Central American Union (1885), the Major Republic of Central America (1897), the United States of Central America (1889), and the Federal Union of Central America (1921). See Felix Fernández-Shaw, *La Integración de Centroamérica*, Madrid, Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1965; and Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., *Central America. A Nation Divided*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976.
17. Karnes, *The Failure of Union*, p. 174.
18. Karnes, *The Failure of Union*, p. 228.
19. Woodward, *Central America. A Divided Nation*, p. 229.
20. ODECA, *Documentos de la Unión Centroamericana*, 1956.
21. Table 2.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
22. Author translation. The original version is available at: <http://www.sica.int/busqueda/autor%20de%20documentación.aspx?IdItem=992&IdCat=28&IdEnt=401> (accessed on October 4, 2008).
23. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
24. Joseph Nye, "Central American Regional Integration," p. 390 in Joseph Nye (ed.), *International Regionalism*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1968, pp. 377–429.
25. Haas, "International Integration, p. 367.
26. Alain Rouquié, "Honduras – El Salvador. La Guerre de Cent Heures: un Cas de 'Désintégration' Régionale," *Revue Française de Science Politique* 21(6), December 1971.
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28. As Isaac Cohen Orantes refers to the years 1951–1959 in *Regional Integration in Central America*, Lexington Books, 1972, pp. 21–24.
29. In a constructivist vein, I analyzed the Central American crisis in: “Invention et Rémanence d’une Crise: Leçons d’Amérique Centrale », *Revue Française de Science Politique* 42(2), August 1992, pp. 555–581.
30. There are a number of good studies of that period. See, for instance, Nora Hamilton, Jeffrey Frieden, Linda Fuller, and Manuel Pastor, Jr. (eds.), *Crisis in Central America. Regional Dynamics and U.S. Policy in the 1980s*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1988; John Booth and Thomas Walker, *Understanding Central America*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1989.
31. See Víctor Flores Olea, *Relación de Contadora*, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988.
32. See John Booth and Mitchell Seligson (eds.), *Elections and Democracy in Central America*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
33. Figure 2.4 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
34. Figure 2.5 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
35. FEDEPRICAP: Federation of private entities of Central America and Panama. I will comment on civil society contribution to the reactivation of integration in chapter seven.
36. Lucile Medina Nicolas, “Central American Borders at the Core of the Regional Integration Process,” *Geopolitics* 12, 2007, pp. 78–108.
37. The depoliticization is also a consequence of the *técnicos’* influence in the region, as noted by different analysts (Schmitter, Wymia).

Three Building a Collective Defense of Democracy

1. With few exceptions such as: Jeffrey Anderson (ed.), *Regional Integration and Democracy. Expanding on the European Experience*, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 1999; Armando Toledano Laredo, *Intégration et Démocratie*, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1982. Strangely, even the volume edited by Laurence Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization. Europe and the Americas*, Oxford University Press, 1996, does not include a chapter on regional integration.
2. Ernst Haas and Philippe Schmitter, “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America,” *International Organization* 18(4), Autumn 1964, p. 737.
3. Haas and Schmitter, “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration,” p. 720.
4. Haas and Schmitter, “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration,” p. 712.
5. Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, Robert Putnam (eds.), *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.
6. Helen Milner and Robert Keohane, “Internationalization and Domestic Politics: An Introduction,” in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (ed.), *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 5.
7. See Wayne Cornelius, Todd Eisenstadt, and Jane Hindley (eds.), *Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico*, San Diego, University of California Press, 1999, and Manuel Antonio Garretón, *La Posibilidad Democrática en Chile*, Santiago de Chile, FLACSO, 1989.
8. Philippe Schmitter, “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration,” *International Organization* 24(4), Autumn 1970, pp. 836–868.
9. Andrew Green, *Political Integration by Jurisprudence. The Work of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in European Political Integration*, Leyden, Sijthoff, 1969.
10. See Charles Powell, “International Aspects of Democratization: The Case of Spain,” in Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization*, pp. 285–314; Toledano Laredo, *Intégration et Démocratie*.

11. All the documents cited are online on the European Navigator (<http://www.ena.lu>, accessed on April 30, 2008).
12. Powell, "International Aspects of Democratization," p. 298.
13. Philippe Schmitter, "The Influence of International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies," p. 44 in Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization*.
14. Table 3.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
15. <http://www.parlatino.org/conteudo.php?id=21&lg=en> (accessed on April 30, 2008).
16. Author's translation of: *Convencidos de que la participación de los pueblos es necesaria para asegurar la consolidación y proyección futura del proceso global de integración de los países de la Subregión Andina; Conscientes de que es indispensable crea un medio de acción común para afirmar los principios, valores y objetivos que se identifican con el ejercicio efectivo de la democracia.*
17. *Art.2—El Parlamento Andino estará constituido por representantes de los pueblos de cada una de las Partes contratantes elegidos por sufragio universal y directo, según procedimiento que los Estados miembros adoptarán mediante Protocolo adicional que incluirá los adecuados criterios de representación nacional que acuerden las Partes.*
Art.3—Hasta que el Protocolo adicional a que se refiere el Artículo anterior entre en vigencia, el Parlamento andino estará constituido por cinco representantes elegidos por los respectivos órganos legislativos de las Partes contratantes de entre sus integrantes, según el procedimiento que cada uno de aquellos adopte para el efecto.
18. No one could at that moment anticipate the extreme violent period that followed. On May 17, 1980, the eve of the presidential elections, the guerrilla movement Shining Path launched its operations.
19. Tentative translation of "*Procurar un ordenamiento político subregional generado en democracia de extracción popular y definido carácter participativo*" and "*el respeto de los derechos humanos, políticos, económicos y sociales constituye norma fundamental de la conducta interna de los Estados del Grupo Andino.*" Spanish version available online at: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/13/40/00025988.pdf (accessed on April 29, 2008).
20. <http://www.parlatino.org/conteudo.php?id=34&lg=en> (accessed on April 29, 2008).
21. See, for instance, Riordan Roett (ed.), *Mercosur. Regional Integration, World Markets*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1999.
22. In October 1977, the Moncloa Pact was a government sponsored agreement between the recently legalized unions and business associations in order to prevent a raise of expectations in the realm of salaries and other social claims against the backdrop of economic crisis. The agreement was also signed by political parties and approved by a vote in the parliament.
23. Cited by Dominique Fournier in "The Alfonsín Administration and the Promotion of Democratic Values in the Southern Cone and the Andes," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31(1), February 1999, p. 44.
24. Diego Achard, Manuel Flores Silva, and Luis Eduardo González, *Las Élités Argentinas y Brasileñas Frente al MERCOSUR*, BID-INTAL, 1994, p. 141.
25. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister of Argentina Jorge Sabato, interviewed in October 1993 by Dominique Fournier. See Fournier, "The Alfonsín Administration," p. 49.
26. *Declaración conjunta Argentina-Uruguay*, Montevideo, May 26, 1987. L'acte de Montevideo approfondit la coopération entre ces deux pays, parallèlement aux efforts de rapprochement avec le Brésil.
27. Arturo Valenzuela, "Paraguay: A Coup that Didn't Happen," *Journal of Democracy*, 8(1), January 1997, pp. 43–55. Tommy Strömberg, *Did Regional Integration Save Democracy in Paraguay? An Analysis of Changing Levels of Governance*, MFS-reports 1998, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University.
28. The European Union had signed on December 15, 1995 a Framework Cooperation Agreement with MERCOSUR. In its Article 1, the agreement mentions that: "Respect

for the democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights inspires the domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement." In addition, since 1992, the EU also had a third generation type of a bilateral agreement with Paraguay. Its Article 1 similarly mentions democracy as a pillar of the co-operation and Article 2 details the way the EU supports Paraguay's democratization.

29. Strömberg, *Did Regional Integration Save Democracy in Paraguay?* p. 20.
30. Dexter Boniface, "Is There a Democratic Norm in the Americas? An Analysis of the Organization of American States," *Global Governance* 8, 2002, p. 376.
31. Fournier, "The Alfonsín Administration," p. 45.
32. This Protocol entered into force on January 17, 2002. Table 3.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
33. Clearly this is not to suggest that no other variable should be taken into account to have a complete picture of the consolidation of democracy in MERCOSUR. On the ambiguity of the European Union's role see Jean Grugel, "Democratization and Ideational Diffusion: Europe, MERCOSUR and Social Citizenship," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45(3), 2007, pp. 43–68.
34. A massive display of popular unrest in the capital city of Venezuela resulted in a death toll of hundreds, if not thousands. The rioters were expressing their desperation following the implementation of neoliberal IMF sponsored reforms by President Carlos Andrés Pérez.
35. Author's translation of: *El sistema democrático constituye la norma inquebrantable, la forma de vida y el instrumento idóneo para preservar la paz, alcanzar el desarrollo y la justicia social, garantizar el pleno respeto a los derechos humanos e impulsar la cooperación e integración entre nuestros pueblos.*
36. Table 3.2 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
37. Table 3.3 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
38. Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler, "A Tale of Two Mesas: the OAS Defense of Democracy in Peru and Venezuela," *Global Governance* 11, 2005, pp. 425–444.
39. Olivier Dabène, "Does the Mercosur Still Have a Project?" in Francisco Domínguez and Márcos Guedes de Oliveira (eds.), *Mercosur: Between Integration and Democracy*, Bern, Peter Lang, 2004.

Four Institutional Isomorphism

1. See, for instance, Miles Kahler, *International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1995.
2. James McCall Smith, "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts," *International Organization* 54(1), Winter 2000, pp. 137–180.
3. McCall Smith, "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design," p. 143.
4. McCall Smith, "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design," p. 138.
5. McCall Smith, "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design," p. 145.
6. McCall Smith, "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design," p. 147.
7. McCall Smith, "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design," p. 150.
8. Francesco Duina, *The Social Construction of Free Trade. The European Union, NAFTA and MERCOSUR*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006.
9. Duina, *The Social Construction of Free Trade*, pp. 71–72.
10. Duina, *The Social Construction of Free Trade*, p. 63.
11. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organization Fields," *American Sociological Review* 48(2), April 1983, pp. 147–160.

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12. Until the EU introduced flexibility in its relations with CAN during the Europe—Latin America summit of Lima (May 16–17, 2008). The final EU press declaration states: “The EC is aware that there are different approaches and sensitivities in the different CAN countries in respect of these negotiations. Therefore, the EC is ready to address sensitive matters with a great deal of flexibility. . . . If this flexibility would not appear sufficient to make progress in these negotiations, other scenarios may be considered such as temporary opt out from the trade pillar of the agreements for one or the other country that is not ready for this at this moment.” (Source: European Commission, Press Declaration, Lima, May 17, 2008).
13. Gary Wynia, *Politics and Planners. Economic Development Policy in Central America*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1972.
14. In North’s classical terms, formal constraints are “rules that human beings devise,” and informal constraints are “conventions and codes of behavior.” See Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 4.
15. Maurice Croisat, Jean-Louis Quermonne, *L’Europe et le Fédéralisme. Contribution à l’Émergence d’un Fédéralisme Intergouvernemental*, Paris, Montchrestien, 1999.
16. Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time. History, Institutions and Social Analysis*, Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 142.
17. Philippe Schmitter, “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration,” *International Organization* 24(4), Autumn 1970, p. 862.
18. Albert Hirschman, *Journeys toward Progress. Studies of Economic Policy-making in Latin America*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1993 (1963); Wynia, *Politics and Planners*.
19. In Article 2.d of the Declaration’s Action Program, the Presidents decided “to promote the conclusion of temporary subregional agreements.” See: <http://www.summit-americas.org/declarat%20presidents-1967-eng.htm> (accessed on May 2, 2008).
20. William Avery and James Cochrane, “Subregional Integration in Latin America: The Andean Common Market,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 11(2), December 1972, pp. 85–102.
21. Richard Adkisson, “The Andean Group: Institutional Evolution, Intraregional Trade, and Economic Development,” *Journal of Economic Issues* 37(2), June 2003, p. 378.
22. Fujimori, in his own words, “temporarily suspended” democracy as suspending constitutional rule, removing judges and dissolving Congress.
23. Article 6 of the Trujillo Protocol.
24. Table 4.2 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
25. According to Adkisson “there is little clear evidence of dramatic improvements corresponding with the institutional reform.” See Richard Adkisson, “The Andean Group: Institutional Evolution, Intraregional Trade, and Economic Development,” p. 378.
26. Table 4.3 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
27. OAS translation: www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/TreatyAsun_e.ASP#CHAPTER_II_ (accessed on May 2, 2008).
28. For all the functions of the different bodies, see the Protocol of Ouro Preto. OAS translation available at: <http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/ourop/index.asp> (accessed on May 2, 2008).
29. Article 32 of the Ouro Preto Protocol. Available at: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/ourop/ourop_e.asp (accessed on October 4, 2008).
30. On this issue, see Deisy Ventura and Alejandro Perotti, *El Proceso Legislativo del Mercosur*, Montevideo, Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 2004.
31. Article 40 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto, available at: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/ourop/ourop_e.asp (accessed on October 4, 2008).
32. Article 40 of the Protocol of Ouro Preto.

33. Roberto Bouzas and Hernán Soltz, "Institutions and Regional Integration: the Case of MERCOSUR," in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism*, London, Institute of Latin American Studies, 2001, pp. 104–105.
34. Duina, *The Social Construction of Free Trade*, p. 97.
35. Duina, *The Social Construction of Free Trade*, p. 99.
36. His exact words were: "We have to make progress on MERCOSUR's institutionalization, as a claim for institutions with supranational characteristics is rising" (*Precisamos avançar também na institucionalização do Mercosul, pois cresce a demanda por instituições com características supranacionais*). The whole speech is available online at: http://www.ifhc.org.br/Upload/conteudo/01_2_87.pdf (accessed on April 29, 2008).
37. See the full list on MERCOSUR's official Web site: <http://200.40.51.219/msweb/principal/contenido.asp> (accessed on May 2, 2008).
38. See the full list on the MERCOSUR official Web site.
39. Celina Pena and Ricardo Rozenberg, *Mercosur: A Different Approach to Institutional Development*, FOCAL Policy Paper, 05–06. See also from the same authors, *Una Aproximación al Desarrollo Institucional del Mercosur: sus Fortalezas y Debilidades*, INTAL-ITD, Documento de divulgación 31, October 2005.
40. Annex 1 of CMC's Decision 30/02 (2002).
41. The first members of the SAT were indeed high profile academics with a will to push the logic of integration to its limit: Deisy Ventura (Law, Brazil), Alejandro Perotti (Law, Argentina), Marcel Vaillant (Economist, Uruguay) and Oscar Stark (Economist, Paraguay). Parts of my developments owe to long conversations I had with Deisy Ventura.
42. GMC's resolution 16/04 (June 25, 2004) mentions that the solicitations of SAT's technical support must be include a "clear description of the work solicited and a justification of its necessity and importance for the MERCOSUR or for the development of a particular negotiation."
43. The Article 2.b of this Annex mentions that one of the SAT's task is to elaborate a report every semester on the evolution of the process of integration, analyzing "the relevant variables affecting the process of integration." Its adds that the reports will also have to identify "in the light of a common perspective, eventual normative lacunas and specific difficulties, or themes of common interest."
44. *Un Foco para el Proceso de Integración Regional*, Primer Informe Semestral de la Secretaría del MERCOSUR, Montevideo, July 2004.
45. During the 2001 Argentine crisis, many observers pronounced MERCOSUR defunct and were quick to write its obituary. The new leftist Presidents elected in 2002 (Lula in Brazil), 2003 (Kirchner in Argentina), and 2004 (Vázquez in Uruguay), decided to strengthen MERCOSUR macroeconomic policy coordination in particular, in order to prevent future crisis.
46. "Desafíos institucionales para el MERCOSUR," Montevideo, August 27–28, 2004.
47. Decision 07/07 mentions that the Secretariat of MERCOSUR can have up to 40 employees.
48. See Decision 11/03.
49. Respectively by GMC's resolutions 66/05 and 54/03.
50. According to the SAT, between March 1991 and May 2007 a total of 1850 norms have been approved. The CMC has taken 473 decisions out of which 210 must be incorporated, and 65 were actually incorporated (30.9%). As for the GMC, the numbers are: 1,206 resolutions out of which 798 must be incorporated and 466 were incorporated (58.4%); and the CCM took 171 directives out of which 122 must be incorporated and 74 were incorporated (60.6%).
51. For a wonderful analysis of the complex relations between institutional mimetism, domestic dynamics and international constraints in MERCOSUR, see Marcelo de A. Medeiros, *La Genèse du Mercosud*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000.

52. See, for instance, Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy. The Case of Latin America Vol.2*, Baltimore, MD, and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
53. Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in Linz and Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy Vol. 2*, p. 36.
54. Andres Malamud, "Presidentialism and Mercosur: A Hidden Cause for a Successful Experience," in *Comparative Regional Integration. Theoretical Perspectives*, edited by Finn Laursen, London, Ashgate, 2003, p. 64.
55. Gabriel Negretto, "Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America. The Cases of Argentina and Brazil," *Comparative Political Studies* 37(5), 2004, pp. 551-562.
56. Carlos Pereira, Timothy Power, and Lucio Rennó, *From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congress*, University of Oxford, Centre for Brazilian Studies, Working Paper CBS 71-06.
57. Wynia, *Politics and Planners*, p. 12.
58. Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State. Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
59. Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira was minister of administration and state reform. He conceived the 1998 Brazilian State reform.
60. Sérgio Henrique Abranches, "O Presidencialismo de Coalizão: O Dilema Institucional Brasileiro," *Dados* 31(1), 1988.
61. Jorge Lanzaro (ed.), *Tipos de Presidencialismo y Coaliciones Políticas en América Latina*, Buenos Aires, CLACSO, 2003.

Five Scope and Level of Integration: Explaining a Mismatch

1. Philippe Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," *International Organization* 24(4), 1970, p. 841.
2. Philippe Schmitter, "Central American Integration: Spill-over, Spill-around or Encapsulation?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 9(1), September 1970, p. 39.
3. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," p. 840.
4. But there is also: spill-over (increase of both scope and level), build-up (increase of level), retrench (increase of level, decrease of scope), muddle-about (increase scope, decrease level), spill-back (decrease of both scope and level), encapsulation (no change).
5. Dorette Corbey, "Dialectical Functionalism: Stagnation as a Booster of European Integration," *International Organization* 49(2), Spring 1995, p. 253.
6. Schmitter, "Central American Integration," p. 26.
7. Table 5.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
8. Isaac Cohen Orantes, *Regional Integration in Central America*, Lexington Books, 1972, p. 32.
9. Cohen Orantes, *Regional Integration in Central America*, pp. 49-54.
10. Cohen Orantes, *Regional Integration in Central America*, p. 60.
11. Declaración de Alajuela, Costa Rica, January 16, 1987. This extract and the following ones have been translated by the author.
12. An English translation is available online at: http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/sica/PDF/TegProtODECA91_e.pdf (accessed on May 1, 2008).
13. Author's translation. Original document available at: http://www.sica.int/busqueda/busqueda_archivo.aspx?Archivo=acue_965_4_29092005.htm
14. English translation available at: <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/70979.htm> (accessed on May 1, 2008).

15. Interview with José Arnoldo Sermeño Lima, secretary of Central American Social Integration, San Salvador, July 19, 2007. At the time of this interview, the representative from Guatemala was the secretary of planning, the one from Honduras the minister of culture, from Nicaragua the minister of family, from Panama the minister of social development and from Costa Rica the minister of housing.
16. CEPAL-BID, *La Integración Centroamericana y la Institucionalidad Regional*, December 10, 1997.
17. Regional integration has never been a burden for Central American governments. According to ROCAP's figures, cited by Joseph Nye in 1965, "the price of running the integration institutions has been quite low: equivalent of roughly 1% of the five government budgets or one-tenth of 1% of the regional gross domestic product. Furthermore, the governments pay only a quarter of these costs directly, the largest part being met from earnings on services and foreign assistance." See Joseph Nye, "Central American Regional Integration," in Joseph Nye (ed.), *International Regionalism*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1968, p. 400.
18. CEPAL, *Open Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean. Economic Integration as a Contribution to Changing Productions Patterns with Social Equity*, September 1994.
19. XIX Cumbre de Presidentes Centroamericanos, *Lineamientos para el Fortalecimiento y Racionalización de la Institucionalidad Regional*, Panamá, July 12, 2007. All the Summits Declarations are available online on SICA's official Web site: <http://www.sica.int> (accessed on May 1, 2008).
20. The text actually reads more as a declaration of intention than a real change, but since both institutions were opposed by Costa Rica (for the Parliament) and Costa Rica and Guatemala (for the Court), it is a consolidation.
21. Reunión Extraordinaria, *Declaración de Managua*, September 2, 1997.
22. Reunión Extraordinaria de Presidentes Centroamericanos, *Declaración Conjunta*, Comalapa, El Salvador, November 8, 1998.
23. Reunión Extraordinaria de Presidentes de Centroamérica, República Dominicana y Belice, *Ayuda Memoria*, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, February 4, 1999.
24. Reunión Extraordinaria de Presidentes Centroamericanos, República Dominicana y Belice con el Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América, *Declaración de Antigua*, Antigua, Guatemala, March 11, 1999.
25. The Plan was composed of eight initiatives in the sectors of energy, transportation, telecommunications, trade facilitation, sustainable development, human development, tourism, and disaster prevention. Official Web site: <http://www.planpuebla-panama.org> (accessed on May 1, 2008).
26. See José Arnoldo Sermeño Lima, *SISCA. Informe de Labores*, 2007. Available online at SICA's Web site: www.sica.int/sisca (accessed on May 1, 2008).
27. Cumbre Extraordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los Países del SICA, San Salvador, November 11, 2005.
28. Reunión Cumbre sobre la Iniciativa Energética Centroamericana, El Salvador, January 22, 2006.
29. Reunión Extraordinaria de Presidentes, Declaración conjunta de los Presidentes de El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala y Nicaragua sobre los Pandillas "Mara Salvatrucha" y "Mara 18," Guatemala, January 15, 2004; Cumbre Extraordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los Países Miembros del SICA sobre Seguridad, Tegucigalpa, October 10, 2006.
30. European Commission, *Central America Regional Strategy Paper 2007–2013*, p. 25 (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ca/rsp/index.htm (accessed on May 1, 2008)).
31. Protocolo de Reformas al Tratado Constitutivo del Parlamento Centroamericano y Otras Instancias Políticas, Reunión Extraordinaria de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de los países del SICA sobre la Institucionalidad Regional, San Salvador, February 20, 2008.

32. One of the three conclusions reached by Roberto Bouzas, Pedro Da Motta Veiga and Ramón Torrent in their *In-Depth Analysis of MERCOSUR Integration, its Prospectives and the Effects Thereof on the Market Access of EU Goods, Services and Investment* (Barcelona, Observatory of Globalization, 2002) is that there are “too many legal acts with no practical effects. This has been probably the result of the need to meet deadlines and targets and provide a sense of progress in “rule making.” This has reduced transparency (i.e., it is unclear which rules are effective) and seriously challenged the credibility of the rule-making process.”
33. In these tables, I used an ad hoc classification that differs from INTAL’s one or, regarding MERCOSUR, from the one used by Roberto Bouzas, Pedro Da Motta Veiga, and Ramón Torrent in their *In-Depth Analysis of MERCOSUR Integration*. See figure 5.1 online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
34. See the figure 5.2 online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
35. See the figure 5.3 online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
36. See: Martha Isabel Gómez Lee, *Protección de los Conocimientos Tradicionales en las Negociaciones TLC*, Bogotá, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2004.
37. Common regime on industrial property.
38. Author’s translation of: *Artículo 3.—Los Países Miembros se asegurarán que la protección conferida a los elementos de la propiedad industrial se concederá salvaguardando y respetando su patrimonio biológico y genético, así como los conocimientos tradicionales de sus comunidades indígenas, afroamericanas o locales. En tal virtud, la concesión de patentes que versen sobre invenciones desarrolladas a partir de material obtenido de dicho patrimonio o dichos conocimientos estará supeditada a que ese material haya sido adquirido de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico internacional, comunitario y nacional. Los Países Miembros reconocen el derecho y la facultad para decidir de las comunidades indígenas, afroamericanas o locales, sobre sus conocimientos colectivos.*
39. WTO Web site (http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm#5, accessed on March 30, 2008).
40. Martha Isabel Gómez Lee, *Protección de los Conocimientos Tradicionales, Op. Cit.*, p.50.
41. See figures 5.4 and 5.5 online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
42. Julio Godio *El Mercosur, los Trabajadores y el ALCA*. Buenos Aires, Editorial Biblos, 2004.
43. The so-called third generation agreements negotiated by the European Union include a clause stipulating that the parties are free to add new issue areas to the agenda.
44. Stephen Clarkson, *Uncle Sam and Us, Globalization, Neoconservatism and the Canadian State*, University of Toronto Press, 2002. See also Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell Cameron, *The Political Economy of North American Free Trade*, New York, Saint Martin’s Press, 1993.
45. John Foster and John Dillon cite U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter having said at the time of CUSTA negotiations: “The Canadians don’t understand what they signed. In twenty years, they will be sucked into the US economy. Free Trade is just the first step in a process leading to the creation of a single North American economy” (“NAFTA in Canada: The Era of a Supra-Constitution,” p.1 on: <http://www.kairoscanada.org/e/economic/trade/NAFTACanada.pdf>, accessed on May 2, 2008).
46. Clarkson, *Uncle Sam and Us*, p. 51.
47. Clarkson, *Uncle Sam and Us*, pp. 71–72.

Six The Parliamentary Option

1. Author’s translation of Paul Magnette, *Contrôler l’Europe. Pouvoirs et Responsabilités dans l’Union Européenne*, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2003, p. 35.
2. Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, “Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44 (3), 2006, pp. 533–562.

3. This point is also made by Magnette, *Contrôler l'Europe*.
4. See Olivier Costa, *Le Parlement Européen, Assemblée Délibérante*, Presses de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2000.
5. With the exception of France after its transition to its Fifth Republic in 1958, adopting a more presidential regime. Nevertheless, in this country most of the parliamentarian had been socialized during the Fourth Republic (1946–1958), a parliamentary regime.
6. Table 6.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
7. In 2008, the PARLATINO is comprised of eleven South American countries (all of them but Guyana), the seven Central American countries, and Aruba, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the Dutch Antillas. See the official Web site: <http://www.parlatino.org> (accessed on April 16, 2008).
8. See the IPA official Web site: <http://www.parlamentoindigena.org> (accessed on April 16, 2008).
9. See the official Web site: <http://www.otca.org.br> (accessed on April 16, 2008).
10. See his interview on <http://www.commercemonde.com/024/sommaire/une-charbonneau.html> (accessed on April 17, 2008).
11. See the official Web site: <http://www.e-fipa.org> (accessed on April 17, 2008).
12. The Treaty, signed on May 23, 2008, stipulates in its article 17 that a protocol will later be adopted creating a Parliament with its headquarter in Cochabamba, Bolivia.
13. Trujillo Protocol, March 10, 1996.
14. Actually the first three days of each month's last week, between March and June and August and November.
15. Interviews with Pedro Montero, assistant general secretary, Bogotá, April 20, 2007 and Ruben Núñez Vélez, general secretary of PARLANDINO, Caracas, April 2, 2008.
16. Article 4 of the Agreement for the Establishment of an Assembly of Caribbean Community parliamentarian.
17. See the English version of the Treaty on <http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp> (accessed on April 18, 2008).
18. Cited by Pierre Hontebeyrie in *Informe final*, Apoyo a la Comisión parlamentaria conjunta del MERCOSUR, August 2003.
19. MERCOSUR/XXV CMC/DEC. 26/03, in *Hacia el Parlamento del MERCOSUR. Una Recopilación de Documentos*, CPC/Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2004.
20. Ricardo Alonso García, *Informe*, Apoyo a la Comisión parlamentaria conjunta del MERCOSUR, June 10 and October 2, 2003.
21. Acuerdo interinstitucional Consejo Mercado Común—Comisión del Mercado Común in *Hacia el Parlamento del MERCOSUR*.
22. See, for instance, Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FESUR), *Desafíos Institucionales para el Mercosur. Documento Preparatorio*, International Seminar, Montevideo, August 27–28, 2004.
23. MERCOSUR/CMC/Decision 05/04, “Aprobación del Programa de Estudios del SAT.”
24. The following comments owe a great deal to a series of interviews and discussions with SAT members and experts during the FESUR Seminar of August 2004.
25. Figure 6.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
26. Author's translation of: “Realizar todas las actividades que correspondan al ejercicio de sus competencias.”
27. At that time Venezuela had dissolved its senate. The adhesion of Venezuela had not yet been ratified by the Brazilian Senate, therefore Venezuela was granted only sixteen representatives, and the right to participate in the debates without voting.
28. And as a result of each country's electoral calendar, elections were about to take place in 2008 in Paraguay, 2009 in Argentina and Uruguay and 2010 in Brazil.
29. See the official Web site: <http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/index1.asp#> (accessed on April 19, 2008).

30. See chapter eight.
31. (A) Legal and institutional issues; (B) Economy, finance, trade, tax, and money; (C) International, interregional, and strategic planning; (D) Education, culture, science, technology, and sports; (E) Labor, employment policy, social security, and social economy; (F) Sustainable regional development, territorial order, housing, health, environment, and tourism; (G) Domestic issues, security, and defense.
32. Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Venezuela has eliminated its Senate so the following argument does not apply to this country.
33. See chapter eight.
34. See figure 6.2 online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
35. See chapter seven.
36. His brother Alberto, who was elected governor of San Luis in 2003 ran for the Presidency in 2007 and even if he lost, he secured 87.5% of the votes in his province.

Seven Integration from Below

1. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2004/epelection/sites/en/results1306/turnout_ep/turnout_table.html
2. There is a growing literature on the topic. See, for instance, Diana Tussie and Mercedes Botto (eds.), *El ALCA y las Cumbres de las Américas: ¿Una Nueva Relación Público-Privada?* Buenos Aires, Editorial Biblos, 2003; and on the particular role played by scholars: Mercedes Botto (ed.), *Saber y Política en América Latina. El Uso del Conocimiento en las Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales*, Buenos Aires, Prometeo, 2007.
3. As defined by Daphné Josselin and William Wallace: “Organizations 1) largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control: emanating from civil society, or from the market economy, or from political impulses beyond control and direction; 2) operating or participating in networks which extend across the boundaries or two or more states—thus engaging in ‘transnational’ relations, linking political systems, economies, societies; 3) acting in ways which affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international institutions—either purposefully or semi-purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities.” (Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: a Framework,” in Daphné Josselin and William Wallace [eds.], *Non-state Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp. 3–4).
4. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1998. Sydney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
5. See, for instance, the following Web sites (all accessed on April 22, 2008): World Bank: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,pagePK:220469~theSitePK:228717,00.html> Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3343,fr_21571361_38620013_38780171_1_1_1_1,00.html United Nations (UN): <http://www.un.org/issues/civilsociety/EuropeanCommission>: http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/index_en.htm/.
6. See chapter nine.
7. José Caballero, “Problematising Regional Integration in Latin America: Regional Identity and the Enmeshed State. The Central American Case,” UNU-CRIS Working Papers, W-2007/2.
8. Caballero, “Problematising Regional Integration in Latin America,” pp. 31–32.
9. See figure 2.1.

10. FECAICA is one of the oldest Central American private sector organizations. Founded in 1959, it has consistently support the regional integration project, especially during its first phase of import-substitution and industrialization strategy.
11. Olivier Dabène, "Quelle Intégration pour quelle Amérique Centrale dans les Années Quatre-vingt-dix?" *Cahiers des Amériques Latines* no. 12, 1992.
12. Cited by Mario Lungo Uclés, *El Salvador in the Eighties. Counterinsurgency and Revolution*, Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1996, p. 136.
13. Table 7.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
14. Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., *Central America. A Divided Nation*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976.
15. U.S. Democracy Promotion Programs in particular. See William Robinson, *Transnational Conflicts. Central America, Social Change, and Globalization*, London, Verso, 2003, p. 225.
16. The State of Mato Grosso do Sul joined CODESUL in 1992.
17. See figure 7.1 on the Web site: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
18. CRECENEA's provinces population: 7.5 million, with: Chaco: 0.9; Corrientes: 0.9; Entre Ríos: 1.1; Formosa: 0.5; Misiones: 0.9; and Santa Fe: 3. CODESUL's states population: 25.3 million, with: Mato Grosso do Sul: 1.9; Paraná: 9; Rio Grande do Sul: 9.6; Santa Catarina: 4.8.
19. See: <http://www.regionnortegrande.com.ar/?noticia=9964> (accessed on April 24, 2008).
20. Table 7.2 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
21. These classifications ought to be taken with caution, as local politics in Brazil sometimes has partisan cleavages of its own.
22. Some Argentinean social organizations from the city of Gualeguaychú criticized the Uruguayan decision to allow the Finnish multinational Botnia and Spanish paper giant ENCE to massively invest in the construction of two paper-pulp plants on Uruguay's bank of the river. The mobilization resulted in a long blockade of the bridge, received the support of President Kirchner and governors. Busti accused Rovira and Colombi of being hypocrites because their provinces had installed the same plants on their side of the river. See www.ellitoral.com/index.php/diarios/2006/11/08/politica/POLI-12.html (accessed on April 25, 2008). For many observers, this crisis epitomizes MERCOSUR's institutional weakness, as Argentina decided to take the case to the International Court of Justice.
23. Asunción (Paraguay); Rosario, La Plata, Córdoba, Buenos Aires (Argentina); Florianópolis, Porto Alegre, Curitiba, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Salvador (Brazil); Montevideo (Uruguay).
24. Cities not only from MERCOSUR's five members (with Venezuela), but also from the associate members (Chile, Bolivia, Peru). See the Mercociudades' official Web site: <http://www.mercociudades.net> (accessed on April 25, 2008).
25. Author's translation of "Favorecer la participación de las ciudades en la estructura del MERCOSUR, persiguiendo la co-decisión en las áreas de su competencia" (Article 2.1 of its Statutes, on the official Web site).
26. Daniel Chaquetti, *El Mercosur y las Ciudades. Apuntes para una Agenda del Comité de Municipios del Foro Consultivo de Municipios, Estados Federados, Provincias y Departamentos del Mercosur*, Montevideo, FESUR, December 2006, pp. 15–16.
27. A secretary was established in Montevideo and a total of ten "technical units" were created: culture, social development, youth, local economic development, tourism, citizen security, education, science and technology, environment and sustainable development, local autonomy, finance, and governance.
28. Many of them were discussed during the Seminar *Políticas de Integración Regional. Experiencias Locales Exitosas en el MERCOSUR*, Tandí, Argentina, September 13–14, 2007. The presentations are posted on Mercociudades official Web site (accessed on April 26, 2008): http://www.mercociudades.net/descargas/documentos/Publicaciones/libro_tandil_set_2007.pdf

29. Diego Achard, Manuel Flores Silva, Luis Eduardo González, *Las Élités Argentinas y Brasileñas frente al MERCOSUR*, Buenos Aires, BID-INTAL, 1994, p. 114.
30. Ministerio de economía, *Iniciativas Inter e Intraempresariales Argentino-Brasileñas en el Marco del MERCOSUR*, Buenos Aires, 1991.
31. Rosario Domingo, Héctor Pastori, Tabaré Vera, *Comportamiento Estratégico de las Empresas Industriales frente a la Apertura*, Montevideo, Universidad de la República, Departamento de Economía, Documento no. 4, 1994.
32. Bernardo Kosacoff, Gabriel Bezchinsky, *De la Sustitución de Importaciones a la Globalización. Las Empresas Transnacionales en la Industria Argentina*, Buenos Aires, CEPAL, Documento de trabajo no. 52, 1993.
33. The survey was based on 414 interviews of “elite members” (politicians, top government agents, entrepreneurs, selected according to their type of activity, reputation, residence, and partisan affiliation). See Achard, Flores Silva, González, *Las Élités Argentinas y Brasileñas*.
34. Wolfram F. Klein, *El MERCOSUR. Empresarios y Sindicatos Frente a los Desafíos del Proceso de Integración*, Caracas, Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 2000.
35. Guillermo Ondarts, “Los Industriales Latinoamericanos y la Nueva Integración,” *Intal* 17, 1991, pp. 3–19, cited by Wolfram Klein, *El MERCOSUR, Empresarios y Sindicatos Frente a los Desafíos del Proceso de Integración*.
36. Also cited by Wolfram Klein, *El MERCOSUR, Empresarios y Sindicatos Frente a los Desafíos del Proceso de Integración*: Eduardo D’Alessio, “El MERCOSUR, la Voz de los Empresarios de los Cuatro Países,” in Adeba, 7a convención de Bancos privados nacionales, Buenos Aires, August 26–28, 1991; Ciesu, *Organizaciones Empresariales y Políticas Públicas*, Fesur e Instituto de Ciencias Políticas, Montevideo, 1992.
37. The group was composed of five Argentine universities (Buenos Aires, La Plata, Litoral, and Rosario), and one from Brazil (Santa Maria), Paraguay (Asunción), and Uruguay (Republic).
38. Sílvia Helena Soares Schwab, José Waimer, *Asociación de Universidades Grupo de Montevideo. 15 años de Historia*, Montevideo, AUGM, 2007, pp. 12–13.
39. Sílvia Helena Soares Schwab, José Waimer, *Asociación de Universidades Grupo de Montevideo. 15 años de Historia*, p. 24.
40. See the official Web site: www.grupomontevideo.edu.uy (accessed on April 27, 2008).
41. The countries invited in 1997 included the four members of MERCOSUR, the two associate members (Chile and Bolivia), and a guest country, Venezuela. In a premonitory way, the Biennial integrated this country ten years before its actual accession to MERCOSUR. These insights are owed to discussions with the Biennial’s officials in 2000–2002.
42. Peter Katzenstein, “International Interdependence: Some Long-term Trends and Recent Change,” *International Organization* 29(4), 1975.
43. GMC Resolution 11/91.
44. Frequent discussions with CUT’s members in charge of the MERCOSUR division in 2001 in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
45. Wolfram Klein, *El Mercosur, Empresarios y Sindicatos Frente a los Desafíos del Proceso de Integración*, p. 182.
46. CMC Decision O4/91.
47. Frequent discussions with FIESP members in charge with the MERCOSUR division in 2001 in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
48. Wolfram Klein, *Empresarios y Sindicatos Frente a los Desafíos del Proceso de Integración*, pp. 189–190.
49. Table 7.3 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
50. See the official Web site: <http://www.fc-es-mercosur.com/es/node/35> (accessed on April 28, 2008).
51. SIECA, *El Desarrollo Integrado de Centroamérica en la Presente Década*, 11 vol., Buenos Aires, INTAL, 1973.
52. Both tables are available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
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53. See the official Web site: http://www.comunidadandina.org/sai/estructura_18.html (accessed on April 28, 2008).
54. See the official Web site: http://www.comunidadandina.org/sai/estructura_19.html (accessed on April 28, 2008).
55. Alvaro de la Ossa, "Gran Caribe: Mecanismos para Profundizar la Participación de los Actores Sociales," pp.141–169 in Francine Jácome, Andrés Serbin (ed.), *Sociedad Civil e Integración Regional en el Gran Caribe*, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad, 1998.
56. See the official Web site: http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/chartercivilsocietyresolution.jsp?menu=secretariat (accessed on April 28, 2008). Another example could be the Inter-American Dialogue. See, for instance, Jorge Domínguez, founding Dialogue member forecasting in 1997 a strengthening of an Inter-American civil society (Jorge Domínguez [ed.], *The Future of Inter-American Relations*, New York, Routledge, 2000).
57. Primer Foro de la sociedad civil del Gran Caribe, *Documentos*, Cartagenas de Indias, Colombia, November 23–26, 1997.
58. *Participación de la Sociedad Civil en los Procesos de Integración*, Montevideo, ALOP, CEFIR, CLAEH, 1998.
59. This is what André Drainville calls the "double movement of social forces in the Americas" (Drainville, "Social Movements in the Americas. Regionalism from Below?" in Gordon Mace and Louis Bélanger [eds.], *The Americas in Transition. The Contours of Regionalism*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1999, p. 235.

Eight Integration and Common Goods

1. Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, Chatham, UK, Chatham House, 1987, p. 234.
2. Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, p. 228.
3. Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, p. 235.
4. Fritz Scharpf, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 6. This perspective has not received sufficient scholar attention. See, for instance, the otherwise extremely stimulating Philippe Schmitter's *How to Democratize the European Union... and Why Bother?* Boston, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.
5. See the discussion in Jaime de Melo, Arvind Panagariya, and Dani Rodrik, "The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective," in Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds.), *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
6. Willem Mole, *The Economics of European Integration. Theory, Practice, Policy*, Aldershot, UK, Ashgate, 4th edition, 2001 p. 396.
7. Table 8.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
8. Like between the Eastern and Western parts of Germany after its reunification.
9. See an official definition in the Europa Glossary: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_en.htm (accessed on May 5, 2008).
10. Centre d'Analyse Stratégique, *The European Union Budget: Some Central Issues at Stake in the 2008–2009 Revision*, July 9, 2007 (online: <http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/FwkdocumentLisbonne4EN.final.pdf>, accessed May 5, 2008).
11. See the research conducted at Sciences Po (Groupe d'économie mondiale): www.gem.sciences-po.fr/content/publications/pdf/PB_transparence_PR_EN170306.pdf, accessed on May 8, 2008.
12. Marco Schaub, *European Regional Policy. The Impact of Structural Transfers and the Partnership Principle since the 1988 Reform*, West Lafayette, IN, Purdue University Press, 2004, p. 80.
13. Scharpf, *Governing in Europe*, p. 50.

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14. The notion of multilevel governance describes this type of decision-making process. See chapter nine.
15. See Rolando Franco and Armando Di Filippo, *Las Dimensiones Sociales de la Integración Regional en América Latina*, Santiago, CEPAL, 1999.
16. Table 8.2 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
17. See the official presentation: http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/agenda_social/pids.htm (accessed on May 5, 2008).
18. Official Web site: <http://www.orasconhu.org> (accessed on May 5, 2008).
19. Marco Ferroni, "Regional Public Goods: The Comparative Edge of Regional Development Banks," Paper presented at the *Conference on Financing for Development: Regional Challenges and the Regional Development Banks*, Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, February 19, 2002 (www.iiea.iie.com/publications/papers/ferroni0202.pdf, accessed on May 6, 2008).
20. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
21. Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, *IIRSA Economic Fundamentals*, ITD-INT, August 2006. <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=800737> (accessed on May 5, 2008).
22. See the official Web site: <http://www.iirsa.org> (accessed on May 5, 2008).
23. Ricardo Carciofi, "Cooperation and Provision of Regional Public Goods. The IIRSA Case," *Integration and Trade*, n°28, January-June 2008, pp. 51-82.
24. Ricardo Carciofi, "Cooperation and Provision of Regional Public Goods. The IIRSA Case," p. 52.
25. See chapter nine.
26. See Kurt-Peter Schütt and Flavio Carucci (ed.), *Retos y Perspectivas de la Integración Energética en América Latina*, Caracas, ILDIS, 2007.
27. See PVDSA's site (accessed on May 5, 2008): http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/readmenu princ.tpl.html&newsid_temas=46
28. Interview with Dominican President Leonel Fernández, February 14, 2008.
29. When the oil prices reached \$70 a barrel, Chávez offered 50%. He promised to go up to 30% if the prices reach \$200 a barrel.
30. "Venezuela Pone sus Reservas a Disposición de Suramérica," *El Tiempo* (Bogota, Colombia), April 18, 2007.
31. See chapter nine for comments on UNASUR.
32. To be sure, only the Argentine military junta believed the United States would help them conquer the islands over the United Kingdom.
33. Table 8.3 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
34. For a more sophisticated discussion on asymmetries in the MERCOSUR, see Roberto Bouzas, "Compensating Asymmetries in Regional Integration Agreements: Lessons from MERCOSUR," in Paulo Giordano, Francesco Lanzafame, and Jörg Meyer-Stamer, *Asymmetries in Regional Integration and Local Development*, Washington, DC, IADB, 2005, pp. 85-112.
35. The following comments are based on a study of all the debates' minutes.
36. Figure 8.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
37. Article 17.1 (Decision 24/05).
38. Even for Paraguay, it represents a mere 0.15% of the GDP, as compared to the structural funds in Europe that at their maximum amounted to about 6% of Spain's GDP.

Nine Regional Multilevel Governance in the Americas?

1. Verónica Montecinos, "Ceremonial Regionalism, Institutions and Integration in the Americas: A Typology of Regional Integration in the Americas," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 37(1), Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 1-37.
- AFBG and Ushin's Book Collection (AFBG) Hosted by Digital Library of the University of the Philippines
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2. Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Stephen Krasner (ed.) *International Regimes*, Cornell University press, 1983, p. 2.
3. Andreas Hasenclever; Peter Mayer; Volker Rittberger (eds.), *Theories of International Regimes*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
4. Inaugurated in 1983, CBI was eventually expanded in 2000 with the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), signed by nineteen countries.
5. Denver (June 30, 1995), Cartagena (March 21, 1996), Belo Horizonte (May 16, 1997), and San José (March 19, 1998). See the official Web site: http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View_e.asp (accessed on May 29, 2008).
6. General Principles and Objectives, Summit of the Americas Fourth Trade Ministerial Joint Declaration, Annex 1, San José, Costa Rica, March 19, 1998 See: http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/SanJose/SanJose_e.asp#AnnexI, accessed on May 29, 2008.
7. At that time, MERCOSUR's average external tariff was 13% against 3% for the United States.
8. General Principles and Objectives, March 19, 1998.
9. General Principles and Objectives, March 19, 1998.
10. Richard Feinberg, *Summitry in the Americas. A Progress Report*, Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, 1997, p. 103.
11. Table 9.1 is available online at: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
12. NAFTA covers exactly the same issue areas, except competition policy. For a view on the way the "Bush and Clinton administrations adopted strategies of targeted side payments in order to enhance the prospects for ratification of the agreement," see William Avery and Richard Friman, "Who Got What and Why: Constructing North American Free Trade," in Kenneth Thomas and Mary Ann Tétreault (eds.), *Racing to Regionalize. Democracy, Capitalism, and Regional Political Economy*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1999, p. 111.
13. A final meeting was held on November 27–29, 1994 at Airlie House (Warrenton, VA) to draft the Plan of Action that would be approved during the Miami Summit. Feinberg, *Summitry in the Americas*, p. 148.
14. James Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 40.
15. James Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-first Century," *Global Governance*, 1, 1995, p. 13.
16. Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric *v.* Multi-level Governance," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34(3), September 1996, p. 346.
17. Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, "Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance," in Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (eds.), *Multi-level Governance*, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 16–17.
18. Of course the notion of governance has also received many criticisms that cannot be mentioned in the scope of this study. See in particular the March 1998 issue of the *International Social Science Journal*.
19. James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics. A Theory of Continuity and Change*, Princeton University Press, 1990.
20. The Inter-American Dialogue, *Convergence and Community. The Americas in 1993*, Washington, DC, Aspen Institute, 1992, p. v.
21. Including the academic community. See, for instance, Abraham Lowenthal, "Latin America: Ready for Partnership?" *Foreign Affairs*, 72(1), 1992–1993, pp. 79–92 ; or Robert Pastor, "The Latin American Option," *Foreign Policy* 88, Autumn 1992, pp. 107–125. In Europe, the same euphoria was perceivable. See the report of the second Euro–Latin America Forum titled *A Convergência Natural* (Lisbon, IEEI, October 1993).
22. "Convergencia: la Palabra Mágica de la Integración," *Capítulos de SELA*, no. 42, January–March 1995.
23. Olivier Dabène, *La Région Amérique Latine. Interdépendance et Changement Politique*, Paris, PUF, 1997, p. 199.

24. Nicola Phillips, "Moulding Economic Governance in the Americas: U.S. Power and the New Regional Political Economy," in Michèle Rioux (ed.), *Building the Americas*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007, p. 25.
25. Richard Feinberg's testimony is once again interesting. The United States wanted to label the Miami summit "Partnership for prosperity." The Brazilians fought hard to include "development." See Feinberg, *Summitry in the Americas*, p. 147.
26. It could also be mentioned that after a decade, NAFTA did not provide a very encouraging model, as far as Mexican development is concerned. See, for instance, René Villarreal, *TLCAN 10 Años Después. Experiencia de México y Lecciones para América Latina*, Bogota, Editorial Norma, 2004, or Dorval Brunelle and Christian Deblock (eds.), *L'ALENA. Le Libre-Echange en Défaute*, Québec, Editions Fides, 2004.
27. Leaving only Market Access, Dispute Settlement and Competition Policy.
28. Originally the Contadora Group was formed in 1983 by Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela to offer a mediation channel to Central America. Four other countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru) later joined them. In 1986, the eight countries decided to create a Political Consultation and Concertation Permanent Forum (also known as the Rio Group).
29. Laurence Whitehead and Alexandra Barahona, "Las Cumbres Mundiales y sus Versiones Latinoamericanas: ¿Haciendo una Montaña de un Grano de Arena?" *América Latina Hoy*, 40, 2005, pp. 15–27.
30. See http://www.opalc.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=468&Itemid=48 (accessed on June 6, 2008).
31. A few days before, Chávez had announced the mobilization of troops along the border. See http://www.opalc.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=335&Itemid=123 (accessed on June 6, 2008).
32. FLACSO's classification includes the following items: (1) Democracy, (2) Human Rights, (3) Security, (4) Economic Integration, (5) Social Development, (6) Modernization of the State, (7) Sustainable Development, (8) International Issues, (9) Culture, (10) Others. In figure 9.1, Politics corresponds to (1) + (2) + (6); Social to (5) + (7) + (9); Economy to (4); International to (3) + (8) and Other to (10).
33. See figure 9.1 on the Web site: <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>.
34. Composed of the following summits:

<i>City</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Type of Summit</i>
Miami (United States)	December 9–11, 1994	First Summit of the Americas
Santa Cruz de la Sierra (Bolivia)	December 7–8, 1996	Summit of the Americas on Sustainable Development
Santiago (Chile)	April 18–19, 1998	Second Summit of the Americas
Québec (Canada)	April 20–22, 2001	Third Summit of the Americas
Monterrey (Mexico)	January 12–13, 2004	Special Summit of the Americas
Mar del Plata (Argentina)	November 4–5, 2005	Fourth Summit of the Americas

See the official Web site: <http://www.summit-americas.org/> (accessed on June 6, 2008).

35. See the official Web site: <http://www.summit-americas.org/miamiplan.htm> (accessed on June 8, 2008).
36. See the official Web site: <http://www.summit-americas.org/miamiplan.htm#APPENDIX> (accessed on June 8, 2008).
37. Feinberg, *Summitry in the Americas*, pp. 161–162.

38. Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and William Smith, "Protest and Collaboration: Transnational Civil Society Networks and the Politics of Summitry and Free Trade in the Americas," *The North South Agenda Papers*, 51, September 2001.
39. Making democracy work better; Human rights and fundamental freedoms; Justice, rule of law and security of the individual; Hemispheric security; Civil society; Trade, investment and financial stability; Infrastructure and regulatory environment; Disaster management; Environmental foundation for sustainable development; Agriculture management and rural development; Labor and employment; Growth with equity; Education; Health; Gender equality; Indigenous Peoples; Cultural diversity; and Children and youth.
40. Composed of past and present hosts of the Summits (in Québec, United States, Chile, and Canada).
41. With Canada, Chile, the United States, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, and one representative from Central America, CARICOM, the Rio Group, and CAN.
42. See the official declaration on FTAA's official Web site: www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/Miami/Miami_e.asp (accessed on June 20 2008).
43. Mónica Serrano rightly points out that despite several proposals made for instance by Venezuela (an Inter-American fund), the final declaration "comes out of a good governance manual: 'each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development through sound policies, good governance, and the rule of law'" (Mónica Serrano, "Conclusion: The Americas and Regional Dis-integration," in Louise Fawcett and Mónica Serrano [eds.], *Regionalism and Governance in the Americas. Continental Drift*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 275).
44. Point 19A: "Some member states maintain that we take into account the difficulties that the process of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations has encountered, and we recognize the significant contribution that the process of economic integration and trade liberalization in the Americas can and should make to the achievement of the Summit objectives to create jobs to fight poverty and strengthen democratic governance. Therefore, we remain committed to the achievement of a balanced and comprehensive FTAA Agreement."
- Point 19B: "Other member states maintain that the necessary conditions are not yet in place for achieving a balanced and equitable free trade agreement with effective access to markets free from subsidies and trade-distorting practices, and that takes into account the needs and sensitivities of all partners, as well as the differences in the levels of development and size of the economies."
- Source: Declaration of Mar del Plata: <http://www.summit-americas.org/Documents%20for%20Argentina%20Summit%202005/IV%20Summit/Declaracion/Declaracion%20IV%20Cumbre-eng%20nov5%209pm%20rev.1.pdf> (accessed on June 8, 2008).
45. Other than OAS and IADB, the other partner organizations of the Summit process are: CEPAL, World Bank, OPAS, Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), Andean Development Bank (CAF), Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Labor Office (ILO), Institute for Connectivity in the Americas (ICA).
46. See, for instance, OAS, *Achievements of the Summits of the Americas. Progress since Mar del Plata, Report of the Joint Summit Working Group*, Washington, DC, 2007, pp. 83–84.
47. Andrew Hurrell, "Hegemony and Regional Governance in the Americas," *Global Law Working Paper* 05/04.
48. Stephen Clarkson, *Uncle Sam and Us. Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State*, University of Toronto Press, 2002, pp.41–42.
49. Philipps, "Moulding Economic Governance in the Americas," p. 35.

50. Mario Pujols, "Detrás de Bastidores: Percepción del Sector Privado Dominicano Frente a las Negociaciones del DR-CAFTA y del EPA," April 2008, <http://www.opalc.org/images/INRE/pujols.pdf>, (accessed on June 25, 2008).
51. Alba in Spanish means dawn.
52. See the historical references on ALBA's official Web site: <http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=32> (accessed on June 11, 2008).
53. Interview with Osvaldo Martínez, president of the Economic Commission of the Cuban Parliament and director of Center for World Economy Studies (CIEM), La Havana, Cuba, February 20, 2008.
54. The "Barrio Adentro" Mission is a social program providing free basic health care to poorest sectors of the population.
55. See the text of the Agreement on ALBA's official Web site: <http://www.alternativabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=81> (accessed on June 11, 2008).
56. See chapter eight.
57. Between September 2006 and November 2007, 673 projects were selected and granted a total amount of US\$15 million. The Venezuelan Bank for Social and Economic Development (BANDES) administers the payments, sometimes with delays. See "El Alba-TCP No Cumple Expectativas del Gobierno," *La Razón*, La Paz, Bolivia, October 23, 2007; "El TCP-Alba Dará US\$9.5 Milliones Hasta Fin de Año," *La Razón*, La Paz, Bolivia, October 24, 2007.
58. Carlos Romero, *Jugando con el Globo. La Política Exterior de Hugo Chávez*, Caracas, Ediciones B, 2006.
59. As of June 2008, the Brazilian Senate had not ratified Venezuela's adhesion. Therefore, Venezuela was still not legally a member of MERCOSUR.
60. Cusco, Peru (December 8, 2004), Brasília, Brazil (September 30, 2005), Cochabamba, Bolivia (December 9, 2006), Margarita, Venezuela (April 17, 2007).
61. See the text on the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' site: http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/imprensa/nota_detalhe3.asp?ID_RELEASE=5466 (accessed on June 24, 2008).
62. Figure 9.2 is available online at <http://us.macmillan.com/author/olivierdabene/>. This figure is exploratory. My intention is no more than suggesting further discussions. For each variable, I gave a coefficient between one and four to each regional grouping, based on the previous chapters' developments. "Level" corresponds to the degree of institutionalization; "Scope" to the number of issue areas included in the agenda; "Actors" to the importance of non State actors (the higher the coefficient the higher the participation of civil society); and "Policies" to the type of integration (the higher the coefficient the more positive the integration).

Conclusion

1. See Olivier Dabène, *Amérique Latine. Les Elections contre la Démocratie?* Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2008.
2. *Tenemos que bajar el umbral de las expectativas*, said Peruvian minister of foreign affairs Fernando García Belaunde in a conference in Paris, on November 16, 2007.

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